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I.  INTRODUCTION 
So-called free trade agreements and investment treaties are currently more 
about instantiating corporate power than they are about leveling the field for 
competitive trade and encouraging direct foreign investment in productive 
capacity.1  The historic and now neo-liberal justifications for free trade are that 
it leverages comparative advantage so that countries produce and export raw 
materials and industrial goods with which they are naturally endowed or are 
relatively more efficient in manufacturing while importing cheaper, more 
efficiently produced goods from abroad.2  The goal is to reduce trade barriers, 
especially tariffs and non-tariff barriers that protect local producers and 
manufacturers from more efficient foreign competitors while allowing 
comparatively efficient domestic exporters the same advantages abroad.  In a 
fictional world of full employment and full utilization of domestic resources, of 
internationally immobile labor and capital, and of perfect competition, 
comparative advantage purportedly increases economic efficiency, lowers the 
cost of living, and produces a win-win trading system when trade is balanced.  
Similarly, the historic justification for the protection of foreign investment is 
that investors need reassurance to invest in other countries, particularly less 
developed economies where their fixed investments might be expropriated or 
their investment returns held hostage.  Moreover, foreign investors need to be 
able to pursue their own self-interest rather than wait on their governments to 
protect them, and thus investors should be empowered to directly bring claims 
against confiscatory state action. 
The high-theory appeal and canonical incantation of free-trade and investor-
protection orthodoxies hides the brutal realities of ascendant corporate power, 
most especially for the purposes of this Article, the power of the innovator 
pharmaceutical industry that relies on the golden-goose of globalized intellectual 
property (IP) protections to extract monopoly profits from the sale of what are 
essentially global public goods.  This industry has relentlessly pursued global 
minimum standards of patent and data protections within what became the 
World Trade Organization and now seeks longer, stronger, and broader forms 
of protection via bilateral, regional, and multilateral trade and economic 
partnership agreements.  At the same time, there has been a proliferation of 
bilateral and regional investment treaties, the vast majority of which give foreign 
investors strengthened rights to bring private arbitration claims against 
government for policies and decisions that thwart their investment-based 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Carmen G. Gonzalez, Deconstructing the Mythology of Free Trade: Critical Reflections on Comparative 
Advantage, 17 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 65 (2006). 
 2 See generally Robert E. Prasch, Reassessing the Theory of Comparative Advantage, 8 REV. POL. 
ECON. 37 (1996). 
3
Baker and Geddes: Corporate Power Unbound: Investorstate Arbitration of IP Monopoli
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2015
4 J. INTELL. PROP. L.  [Vol. 23:1 
 
expectations of profit, including those stemming from their asserted intellectual 
property rights.   
Despite the deep irony of free trade agreements being subverted to codify 
and extend anti-competitive monopoly rights and despite the equally deep irony 
of foreign investors having greater enforcement rights than local investors, the 
combination of enhanced intellectual property rights (IPRs) and protections and 
strengthened investor rights is creating a wild-west opportunity for unbounded 
corporate power.  Two current contestations show the dangers of this expanded 
power in sharp relief.  First, in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 
(TPPA), at the behest of its powerful pharmaceutical lobby, the United States 
sought the most extreme forms of pharmaceutical patent, data, and 
enforcement rights that had ever been proposed at the same time that it sought 
enhanced IP-related investor rights.3  Although U.S. early demands were not all 
fully met, the formal TPPA negotiations have been concluded and a legally 
scrubbed version of the final agreed text was released on January 26, 2016.4  
                                                                                                                   
 3 For early evidence of U.S. IP demands, see Trans-Pacific Partnership, Intellectual Property 
Rights Chapter (draft Feb. 10, 2011), available at http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/tpp-
10feb2011-us-text-ipr-chapter.pdf; Trans-Pacific Partnership—Intellectual Property Rights Chapter 
(Selected Provisions), Sept. 2011, available at http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/wp-content/uploa 
ds/2011/10/TransPacificIP1.pdf.  For an analysis of these leaks, see Sean M. Flynn, Brook Baker, 
Margot Kaminski & Jimmy Koo, The U.S. Proposal for an Intellectual Property Chapter in the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 105, 105–83 (2013).  For early evidence of U.S. 
investment demands, see Draft TPP Investment Chapter, available at http://www.citizenstrade.org/ 
ctc/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/tppinvestment.pdf.  The most recent Investment Chapter leak 
was Trans-Pacific Partnership treaty: Advanced Investment Chapter working document for all 12 
nations (January 20, 2015 draft, released by Wikileaks, March 25, 2015), https://wikileaks.org/tpp-in 
vestment/WikiLeaks-TPP-Investment-Chapter.pdf.  See Trans Pacific Partnership Document 
Library, http://infojustice.org/resource-library/tpp (last visited Sept. 25, 2015) (providing a 
comprehensive collection of early TPP leaked documents and commentary between 2010 and 2014). 
  In terms of the history of the TPPA, On November 12, 2011, the Leaders of the nine Trans-
Pacific Partnership countries—Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, 
Singapore, Vietnam, and the United States—announced the achievement of the broad outlines of 
an ambitious, 21st-century Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement that would enhance trade 
and investment among the TPP partner countries, promote innovation, economic growth and 
development, and support the creation and retention of jobs. Outlines of TPP, http://www.ustr. 
gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/november/united-states-trans-pacific-partnership 
(last visited Oct. 18, 2015).  Since that time, Mexico and Canada, the U.S.’s NAFTA trade 
partners also joined the negotiations.  Japan also elected to participate in the negotiations.  See 
Statement by Acting U.S. Trade Representative Demetrios Marantis on Japan’s Announcement Regarding the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (Mar. 15, 2013), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-release 
s/2013/march/amb-marantis-statement-japan-tpp.   
 4 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Trade and Affairs, Text of the Transpacific Partnership 
(downloadable by chapter), https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/about-us/who-we-are/treaty-making-
process/trans-pacific-partnership-tpp/text-of-the-trans-pacific-partnership. 
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The TPPA was signed on February 4, 2016, but formal ratification awaits.5  
Second, in Eli Lily v. Canada, an American pharmaceutical company is claiming 
$500 million in damages under the North America Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) investment clause because Canada invalidated two medical patents 
that failed to meet well-established Canadian standards of patentability.6   
This Article is not written as an abstract juxtaposition of these two current 
events.  It is written to expose the dangers that countries face, especially low- 
and middle-income countries, in trade negotiations with the U.S., Europe, and 
Japan.  These nations seek to impose stronger patent, data, and market entry 
protections while simultaneously expanding the armamentarium of enforcement 
powers available to pharmaceutical behemoths.  Part II of this Article contains a 
brief introduction to the international IP regime, namely the WTO Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)7 and the 
TRIPS-plus pharmaceutical protections contained in the TPPA Intellectual 
Property Chapter8 and Transparency Annex9 recently signed by twelve Pacific 
rim countries.  Part III gives a brief historical background on investment 
treaties and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS).  Part IV analyzes the 
TPPA Investment Chapter10 in more depth, particularly its provisions dealing 
with protection for, and enforcement of, IP-related investments.  Part V 
discusses the pending Eli Lilly v. Canada ISDS arbitration, including the claims 
and defenses of the parties.  Part VI concludes with a recommendation that 
investment chapters be struck from the TPPA and other trade agreements or 
alternatively, that such chapters should not apply whatsoever to the protection 
                                                                                                                   
 5 Rebecca Howard, Trans Pacific Partnership signed but years of negotiations still to come, FORBES (Feb. 
4, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-tpp-idUSKCN0VD08S; TPP Ministers Outline 
Ratification Process; Mexico, Australia Aim For 2016 Approval, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Feb. 3, 2016), 
http://insidetrade.com/daily-news/tpp-ministers-outline-ratification-process-mexico-australia-ai 
m-2016-approval. 
 6 Eli Lilly and Co. v. The Gov’t of Canada [hereinafter Eli Lilly v. Canada], UNCITRAL, 
ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/cas 
edetail.aspx? CaseNo=UNCT/14/2&tab=DOC (last visited Sept. 25, 2015). 
 7 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, THE LEGAL 
TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 320 
(1999), 869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 8 TPPA Chapter 18 Intellectual Property, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/_securedfiles/Tr 
ans-Pacific-Partnership/Text/18.-Intellectual-Property.pdf [hereinafter IP Chapter].  Previous 
versions of this chapter were leaked in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014.   
 9 TPPA Chapter 26 Transparency, Annex 26-A on Transparency and Procedural Fairness for 
Pharmaceutical Products and Medical Devices, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/_securedfiles/ 
Trans-Pacific-Partnership/Text/26.-Transparency-and-Anti-Corruption-Chapter.pdf [hereinafter 
Transparency Annex]. 
 10 TPPA Chapter 9 Investment, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/_securedfiles/Trans-Pacif 
ic-Partnership/Text/9.-Investment-Chapter.pdf [hereinafter Investment Chapter]. 
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or enforcement of IPRs given the many other enforcement powers available to 
patent holders.  This Article claims that extending boundless corporate power 
to Big Pharma through adoption of ISDS for IPRs presents a grave danger to 
the communal right to health and the right of access to affordable medicines for 
all.11 
II.  THE BIRTH OF GLOBALIZED IP PROTECTION FOR PHARMACEUTICALS 
AND ITS PROPOSED EXPANSION IN THE TPP IP CHAPTER 
Although scholars trace the history of IPRs back several centuries, the first 
efforts to set any global standards with respect to patents occurred with the 
adoption of the 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 
(Paris Convention),12 the 1986 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Works (Berne Convention),13 and with the imposition of colonial 
IP regimes.14  The strictures of the Paris Convention were quite limited; in 
terms of patents, it principally required non-discrimination against patent 
applicants from other countries; provided for rights of priority, division of 
patents, and identification of the inventor; restricted the grounds for revocation; 
and expanded permissible uses of compulsory licenses.  In Africa, Asia, and the 
Pacific, the parallel introduction of colonial IP laws began in the late nineteenth 
century after the 1884 Congress of Berlin.15  Nonetheless, despite these partial 
successes, rich countries and IP-based industries were interested in extending 
the scope of IP protections beyond the Paris and Berne Conventions because 
both Conventions lacked effective enforcement measures and because their 
reach was not yet truly global. 
In 1967, during a period of development-oriented contestation over IPRs by 
newly independent states, developed countries succeeded in establishing the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which was empowered to 
administer the Paris and Berne Conventions and also to promote 
harmonization of intellectual property legislation.  “Within WIPO, developed 
countries conducted a protracted campaign to deepen, strengthen, and extend 
                                                                                                                   
 11 For an articulation of the communal right to health and of access to affordable medicines, 
see, Yousuf A. Vawda & Brook K. Baker, Achieving Social Justice in the Human Rights/Intellectual 
Property Debate: Realising the Goal of Access to Medicines, 13 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 55, 57–84 (2013). 
 12 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 
828 U.N.T.S. 305. 
 13 The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, September 9, 1886, as 
revised at Paris on July 24, 1971 and 25 amended Sept. 28, 1979, 102 Stat. 285 3, 1161 U.N.T.S. 31. 
 14 Brook K. Baker & Tenu Avafia, The Evolution of IPRs from Humble Beginnings to the Modern Day 
TRIPS-Plus Era: Implications for Treatment Access 8–9 (Global Commission on HIV and the Law, 
Working Paper for the Third Meeting of the Technical Advisory Group, 2011). 
 15 Id. 
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the scope and application of IP, but a resilient coalition of developing countries, 
led by Brazil and India, was steadfast in opposing such measures.”16  As a 
consequence of their failure to secure global standards of IP protection within 
WIPO, IP-based industries pushed their countries’ trade negotiators to establish 
a harmonized system of IPRs and IP enforcement within the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).17   
The pharmaceutical industry played a particularly active role in 
initiating and consolidating a robust coalition of IP industries that 
persuaded trade negotiators, first in the U.S. and then in Europe 
and Japan to champion a comprehensive and enforceable 
international IP regime, and to do so within the context of 
GATT negotiations.  Pfizer in particular played a leading role 
ideologically throughout the 1970s and 1980s, especially in 
forging the Intellectual Property Committee, an international 
business coalition whose paper became the blueprint for IP 
demands by high-income countries in the GATT negotiations.  
The pharmaceutical industry was primarily interested in 
eliminating what it felt was unfair discrimination against the 
patenting of medicines, but it was also motivated to try to gain 
control over uses of its clinical and regulatory data to delay 
registration of generic equivalents, in essence seeking another 
form of exclusive rights.18 
Ultimately, with a mixture of trade sanctions, threats, and agricultural and 
textile inducements, the TRIPS Agreement was adopted as one of the primary 
texts of the newly established WTO.  The TRIPS Agreement established a 
global floor of substantive protections and enforcement measures for 
pharmaceuticals through patents and registration-related data rights.  Pursuant 
to TRIPS, member states are obliged to grant product and process patents to all 
applicants on an equal basis without discrimination with respect to the domicile 
of the inventor, the field of technology, or the eventual importation of the 
invention.19  Patents must be granted for a minimum of twenty years20 and 
                                                                                                                   
 16 Id. at 6. 
 17 See PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE 
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY (Earthscan Publications Ltd. 2003) (providing a detailed history of the 
political and strategic genesis of the TRIPS Agreement as engineered by U.S. knowledge 
industries); see also DUNCAN MATTHEWS, GLOBALISING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS – THE 
TRIPS AGREEMENT (Routledge 2002).  
 18 Baker & Avafia, supra note 14, at 6–7. 
 19 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 27.1. 
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allow the patent holder to exclude others from “making, using, offering for sale, 
selling, or importing” patent-infringing products.21  In addition to granting 
exclusive patent rights, the TRIPS Agreement also provides limited protections 
for pharmaceutical data submitted for the purpose of obtaining marketing 
approval.22  Such confidential data, at least with respect to new chemical entities 
and data, which required considerable effort to originate, is to be protected 
against unfair commercial use.23  The pharmaceutical industry and trade 
representatives from wealthy countries have persistently claimed that TRIPS’s 
data protection clause actually requires data exclusivity—a monopoly right that 
would prevent a country from referencing or relying on regulatory data 
previously submitted in order to grant marketing approval for a generic 
equivalent.24 
Despite the passage of TRIPS, member states retained important 
interpretative freedom and specific flexibilities to protect public interests, 
including the right to health.  These reserved rights include 
•  to strictly define baseline patentability rules (novelty, 
inventive step, and industrial applicability),25 to compel 
disclosures,26 and to allow pre- and post-grant 
oppositions27 to ensure only high quality patents are 
granted and to prevent “evergreening;” 
•  to exclude patents for certain subjects, such as patents on 
surgical, diagnostic and therapeutic methods, and plants 
and animals;28 
                                                                                                                   
 20 Id. art. 33. 
 21 Id. art. 28.1. 
 22 Id. art. 39.3. 
 23 Id.  
 24 See generally Carlos M. Correa, Unfair Competition under the TRIPS Agreement: Protection of Data 
Submitted for the Registration of Pharmaceuticals, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 69 (2002); Aaron X. Fellmeth, Secrecy, 
Monopoly, and Access to Pharmaceuticals in International Trade Law: Protection of Marketing Approval Data 
under the TRIPS Agreement, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 443 (2004); Jerome H. Reichman, Rethinking the Role 
of Clinical Trial Data in International Intellectual Property Law: The Case for a Public Goods Approach, 13 
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1 (2009); Brook K. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid: Taming 
Data Exclusivity and Patent/Registration Linkage, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 303 (2008). 
 25 Article 1.1 gives countries considerable interpretive freedom to implement the Agreement 
within their own legal system and practice.  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7.  Article 27.1 states 
the basic required standards of patentability but does not define them further. 
 26 Id. art. 29. 
 27 Id. art. 62.4; see WIPO Standing Comm. on the Law of Patents, OPPOSITION SYSTEMS AND 
OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE REVOCATION AND INVALIDATION MECHANISMS (Apr. 2012), http:// 
www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_18/scp_18_4.pdf. 
 28 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 27.3. 
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•  to adopt limited exceptions including Bolar/early-
working and experimental/research use;29  
•  to issue compulsory licences and government use 
orders;30 
•  to parallel import goods placed lawfully on the market;31  
•  to regulate and prevent abusive practices that 
unreasonably restrain trade and adversely affect the 
transfer of technology;32 and 
•  to make use of transitional periods and waivers.33  
Because the U.S. and Europe persisted post-TRIPS in trying to coerce low- and 
middle-income countries not to use their TRIPS flexibilities, developing 
countries, led by the Africa Group, fought for clarification of those flexibilities.  
The historical Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
provided this clarification.34 
The battle over pharmaceutical IPRs has continued since the Doha 
Declaration.  European, American, and Japanese negotiators have shifted 
forums away from the WTO to conclude bilateral and regional “free trade” 
agreements (FTAs) and economic partnership agreements (EPAs) with 
extensive TRIPS-plus protections that have a negative effect on public health 
and access to medicines.35  The TPPA is perhaps the most troubling and 
                                                                                                                   
 29 Id. art. 30; see Christopher Garrison, Exceptions to Patent Rights in Developing Countries (Aug. 
2006), http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteipc200612_en.pdf; Evans Misati & Kyoshi Adachi, 
The Research and Experimentation Exceptions in Patent Law: Jurisdictional Variations and the WIPO 
Development Agenda (2010), http://www.ictsd.org/downloads/2011/12/the-research-and-experm 
entation-exceptions-in-patent-law-jurisdictional-varations-and-the-wipo-development-agenda.pdf. 
 30 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 31; see Cecilia Oh, Compulsory Licenses: Recent Experiences 
in Developing Countries, 1 INT’L J. INTELL. PROP. MGMT. 22, 22–36 (2006); Jerome H. Reichman & 
Catherine Hasenzahl, Non-voluntary Licensing of Patented Inventions: Historical Perspective, Legal 
Framework under TRIPS, and an Overview of the Practice in Canada and the USA (June 2003), http:// 
www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsd_series/iprs/CS_reichman_hasenzahl.pdf; see generally Brook K. Baker, 
Arthritic Flexibilities for Accessing Medicines: Analysis of WTO Action Regarding Paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 14 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 613, 613–715 
(2004). 
 31 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 6; see Frederick M. Abbott, First Report (Final) to the 
Committee on International Trade Law of the International Law Association on the Subject of Parallel 
Importation, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 607, 607–36 (1998). 
 32 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 8.2, 40. 
 33 Id. arts. 65, 66 and extensions thereof. 
 34 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002). 
 35 Peter Drahos, Expanding Intellectual Property’s Empire: the Role of FTAs (2003), available at http:// 
www.ictsd.org/down102ds/2608/08/drahos-fta-2003-en.pdf; Francisco Rossi, Free trade agreements 
and TRIPS-plus measures, 1 INT’L J. INTELL. PROP. MNGT. 150 (2006); UNDP/UNAIDS ISSUE BRIEF, 
9
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advanced example.  The final text contains the following TRIPS-plus 
provisions, most based on proposals from the United States: 
•  Requiring countries to ease standards for granting 
secondary patents by requiring patents on new uses or 
methods of use of known substances;36 
•  Lowering standards for the definition of “inventive 
step”;37 
•  Eliminating certain exclusions for invention derived from 
plants38 and requiring ratification or accession to the 
International Convention for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants;39  
•  Providing extensions of patent terms beyond the TRIPS-
required 20 years to compensate for regulatory delays in 
granting patents40 or marketing approvals;41  
•  Requiring periods of data exclusivity, including successive 
periods, that prevent medicines regulatory authorities 
from referencing or relying on clinical trial data submitted 
by originators to grant marketing approval for generic 
equivalents;42  
•  Requiring drug regulatory authorities to link marketing 
approval to the absence of any claimed patents or to 
provide notice of marketing approval application and 
opportunity to adjudicate validity or infringement;43 and 
•  Enhancing enforcement measures including mandatory 
injunctions,44 heightened damages,45 and confiscatory 
border measures.46  
                                                                                                                   
THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS ON PUBLIC HEALTH (2012), available at 
http://unaids.org/sites/default/files/media_asset/JC2349_Issue_Brief_Free-Trade-Agreements_e 
n_o.pdf. 
 36 IP Chapter, supra note 8, art. 18.37.2. 
 37 Id. art. 18.37.1, n.30 (obviousness to a person skilled or having ordinary skill in the art in 
light of the prior art). 
 38 Id. art. 18.37.4. 
 39 Id. art. 18.7.2(d). 
 40 Id. arts. 18.46.3–.4. 
 41 Id. art. 18.48.2. 
 42 Id. arts. 18.50.1, 18.50.2, 18.54 (five plus three years for non-biologic pharmaceuticals); id. arts. 
18.52.1(a), 18.51.1(b) (eight years or five years plus comparable market protection for biologics). 
 43 Id. arts. 18.51.1–.2. 
 44 Id. arts. 18.74.2. 
10
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Unsurprisingly, Article 18.6.1 references the Doha Declaration at the same 
time that it reiterates the parties’ commitment to the IP Chapter.  
The obligations of this Chapter do not and should not prevent a 
Party from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, 
while reiterating their commitment to this Chapter, the Parties 
affirm that this Chapter can and should be interpreted and 
implemented in a manner supportive of each Party’s right to 
protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to 
medicines for all.47  
Article 18.6 also references the TRIPS/health solution and commits parties to 
notifying the WTO of their acceptance of the same.48 
The Transparency Annex49 gives pharmaceutical companies multiple 
opportunities to influence medical product listings for reimbursement though 
not the level of such reimbursement.  If adopted, the Transparency Annex 
would require parties to render listing decisions within a specified time period, 
to afford applicants timely opportunities to provide comments and materials in 
support of their applications, to provide written justifications for their 
decisions, and to grant a review or reconsideration process for aggrieved 
applicants.50 
These TPPA provisions, individually and collectively, can adversely impact 
access to medicines in TPPA parties.51  More patents might be granted on a 
particular medicine extending the time period of monopoly control and delaying 
                                                                                                                   
 45 Id. art. 18.74.4 (requiring that judicial authorities consider the market price or suggested retail 
price as am proper measure of damages for patent infringements). 
 46 Id. art. 18.76 (applying to copyright and trademark infringements, including transshipment of 
confusingly similar trademark goods). 
 47  Id. art. 18.6.1(a). 
 48 Id. arts. 18.6.1(b), 18.6.2. 
 49 Transparency Annex, supra note 9. 
 50 Id. para. A.2. 
 51 See, e.g., Buruc Kilic, Hannah Brennan & Peter Maybarduk, What is Patentable under the Trans-
Pacific Partnership?  An Analysis of the Free Trade Agreement’s Patentability Provisions from a Public Health 
Perspective, 40 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE (2015), http://www.yjil.org/docs/pub/o-40-killic.pdf; The 
Foundation for AIDS Research, Issue Brief: Trans-Pacific Partnership: Curbing Access to Medicines Now and 
in the Future (2015), http://www.amfar.org/uploadedFiles/_amfarorg/Articles/On_The_Hill/20 
15/IB_TPP_Brief_RC_050615.pdf.  For an access-to-medicines critique of earlier draft IP 
Chapter provisions, see Flynn, Baker, Kaminski & Koo, supra note 3, at 149–83; Ruth Lopert & 
Deborah Gleeson, Symposium: Global Health & Law – The High Price of “Free” Trade: U.S. Trade 
Agreements and Access to Medicines, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 199, 206–10 (2013); see generally 
UNITAID, TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR ACCESS TO MEDICINE 
AND PUBLIC HEALTH (2014), available at http://www.unitaid.eu/images/marketdynamics/publica 
tions/TPAA-Report_Final.pdf. 
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generic competition.  The duration of exclusive rights can also be prolonged 
because of patent term extensions that compensate for patenting and regulatory 
delays.  In addition, new forms of monopoly protection are erected that delay 
marketing approval of generic equivalents, namely data exclusivity and patent-
registration linkage.52  Patent holders will also have additional enforcement 
powers and deterrent remedies against alleged infringers and will have new 
opportunities to insist that their products be listed on therapeutic formularies 
and that their medicines be reimbursed at a high rate.  However, pharmaceutical 
companies are gaining more than the power to pursue enhanced private 
enforcement rights, or to seek governmental support in guarding borders and 
confiscating alleged infringing products, or even to seek state-state dispute 
resolution if their IPRs are not adequately protected.  They also will have greatly 
expanded IP-enforcement rights directly against governments if their well-
grounded expectations of profits are frustrated by adverse patent or regulatory 
rulings.  The importance of IP-investor Rights cannot be overstated. 
III.  BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON INVESTMENT TREATIES AND 
INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
Free trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties (BITs) typically 
contain investment clauses designed to attract direct foreign investment and 
protect the interests of foreign investors against grossly unfair, confiscatory, or 
discriminatory treatment.53  In addition to defining the types of foreign 
investment entitled to protection, investment chapters typically allow for both 
interstate dispute settlement and investor-state dispute settlement; the latter 
means that if a foreign investor believes that its investment has been unlawfully 
devalued by government action it can either induce its government to seek 
resolution on its behalf or directly launch arbitral proceedings against the 
offending government before a private panel of trade lawyers.54  Typical claims 
under investment clauses address: (1) alleged violations of minimum 
standards of treatment for foreign investors, i.e., fair and equitable treatment 
and full protection and security—basically policy protection and adjudicative 
due process; (2) direct or indirect expropriation, including what we call in the 
U.S. “regulatory takings”; and (3) national treatment and most favored 
nation principles requiring host governments to afford foreign investors 
                                                                                                                   
 52 IP Chapter, supra note 8, arts. 18.51, 18.52; see Baker, supra note 30, at 613–715. 
 53 Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITRs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67, 67–130 (2005); Zachary Elkins, 
Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, 1960–2000, 60 INT’L ORG. 811, 811–46 (2006).  
 54 See, e.g., Investment Chapter, supra note 10. 
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treatment that is no less favorable than that afforded to domestic entities in 
similar circumstances or no less favorable than that afforded to investors from 
another state that has an investment agreement with the host government.  
International investment treaties also frequently mandate free flow of capital 
and place restrictions on prudent capital controls, something now recognized as 
having contributed to asset bubbles and global financial insecurity.  Finally, they 
greatly restrict performance requirements designed to promote domestic inputs 
as a condition of foreign investment activity. 
United States Bilateral Investment Treaties are designed to ensure that 
investments provide six basic benefits, often referred to as the “core” BIT 
principles: 
•  First, our BITs provide that investors and their “covered 
investments” (that is, investments of a national or 
company of a Party in the territory of the other Party) are 
entitled to be treated as favorably as the host Party treats 
its own investors and their investments or investors and 
investments from any third country.  The BITs generally 
afford the better of national treatment (NT) or most 
favored nation (MFN) treatment for the full life cycle of 
investment, i.e., from its establishment or acquisition, 
through its management, operation and expansion, to its 
disposition. 
•  Second, “BITs establish clear limits on the expropriation 
of investments and provide for payment of prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation when expropriation 
takes place.” 
•  Third, “BITs provide for the transferability of funds into 
and out of the host country without delay using a market 
rate of exchange.”  This covers all transfers related to a 
covered investment and creates a predictable 
environment guided by market forces. 
•  Fourth, the circumstances in which performance 
requirements can be imposed are limited.  The 
performance requirement disciplines apply to specific 
circumstances that would require covered investments to 
adopt inefficient and trade-distorting practices (e.g., local 
content requirements or export quotas) as a condition for 
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, 
conduct, or operation. 
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•  Fifth, BITs give investors from both Parties the right to 
submit an investment dispute with the treaty partner’s 
government to international arbitration.  There is no 
requirement to use that country’s domestic courts. 
•  Sixth, BITs give covered investments the right to engage 
the top managerial personnel of their choice, regardless 
of nationality.55 
The vast majority of investor-state dispute resolution claims are handled by 
the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), 
although there are alternative arbitral forums, regional and otherwise.56  Most 
investment treaties allow recourse to ICSID arbitration without first exhausting 
local judicial or administrative remedies, a right frequently not given to 
domestic investors with respect to exhaustion or post-exhaustion review.  
Typically, a panel of three private arbitrators is chosen to establish an investor-
state dispute resolution tribunal, often from a surprisingly small pool of 
international trade lawyers.57  Decisions are non-reviewable except through 
annulment proceedings addressing a narrow range of tribunal errors and are 
                                                                                                                   
 55 Bilateral Investment Treaties, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/bilateral-investment-treaties 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2015).  
 56 The ICSID arbitration rules are contained in the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 18 March 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, 4 I.L.M. 532 
(entered into force 14 October 1966) [ICSID Convention] and the rules created by the ICSID 
Administrative Council pursuant to arts. 6(1)(a) to (c) of the ICSID Convention, Administrative and 
Financial Regulations, Rules of Procedure for the Institution of Conciliation and Arbitration Proceedings; Rules of 
Procedure for Arbitration.  These rules are published in ICSID, ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, 
Doc. ICSID/15 (Washington: ICSID, 2006). The ICSID Additional Facility for the 
Administration of Conciliation, Arbitration and Fact-Finding Proceedings was created by the 
ICSID Administrative Council on September 27, 1978.  ICSID Additional Facility for the 
Administration of Conciliation, Arbitration and Fact-Finding Proceedings, Doc. ICSID/11 (Washington: 
ICSID, 1979).  Schedule C of the ICSID Additional Facility, sets out the Arbitration (Additional 
Facility) Rules.  On April 5, 2006, the Administrative Council approved amendments to the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules and the Additional Facility Rules creating greater transparency and allowing amicus 
participation in ICSID proceedings for the first time, available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICS 
ID/ICSID/RulesMain.jsp.  For a critique and review of the 2006 revisions, see J. Anthon 
VanDuzer, Enhancing the Procedural Legitimacy of Investor-State Arbitration Through Transparency and 
Amicus Curiae Participation, 52 MCGILL L.J. 681 (2007). 
  An alternative international system for investor-state arbitration is pursuant to United 
National Commission on International Trade Law [UNCITRAL] Arbitration Rules (2010), 
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-rules-re 
vised-2010-e.pdf.  There are several regional mechanisms for investor-state arbitration as well.   
 57 PIA EBERHARDT & CECILIA OLIVET, TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE AND CORPORATE EUROPE 
OBSERVATORY REPORT, PROFITING FROM INJUSTICE 8 (2012), http://www.tni.org/pressrelease/e 
xposed-elite-club-lawyers-who-make-millions-suing-states.   
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heard by another arbitral tribunal instead of by judges.58  Although arbitral 
decisions are not precedential,59 panels frequently cite other tribunal decisions60 
even as they also frequently ratchet up investor protections.61   
Investor-state dispute resolution is facing a crisis of credibility given its 
perceived bias towards investor prerogatives.  The analysis here, however, 
focuses not on legitimacy debates,62 but rather on a particular threat to access to 
medicines posed by pharmaceutical companies pursuing investor-state claims.  
More specifically, the analysis focuses on the pro-investor TPPA Investment 
Chapter63—and on the first ever IP-related pharmaceutical investor-state 
arbitral claim by Eli Lilly against Canada that demonstrates the danger of 
investment claims in the pharmaceutical context.64   
The investor-state dispute settlement regime was ostensibly established to 
encourage direct foreign investment and thereby facilitate the efficient and free 
flow of capital to its most productive uses.  By allowing private investors to 
seek remedies before purported neutral arbiters, foreign investors could avoid 
                                                                                                                   
 58 Nigel Blackaby, Public Interest and Investment Treaty Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: IMPORTANT CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONS 355, 364 (Albert Jan van 
den Berg ed., 2002) (expressing early concern over the absence of appellate review in the 
investor-state arbitration context). 
 59 Joshua Karton, Lessons from International Uniform Law, in RESHAPING THE INVESTOR-STATE 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM: JOURNEYS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 48, 67 (Jean E. Kalicki, Anna 
Joubin-Bret eds., Koninklijke Brill NV 2015). 
 60 Id. at 65. 
 61 Robin Broad, Corporate Bias in the World Bank Group’s International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes: A Case Study of a Global Mining Corporation Suing El Salvador, 36 U. PENN. J. INT’L 
L. 851, 851–74 (2015).  
 62 Cf. William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigations in a Public Law Sphere: 
The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 283 (2010) (arguing for a 
“margin of appreciation” standard of review); Alec Stone Sweet, Investor-State Arbitration: 
Proportionality’s New Frontier, 4 LAW & LEGAL ETHICS OF HUM. RTS. 47 (2010) (arguing for 
adoption of a proportionality review balancing public and private interests); Caroline Henckels, 
Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate: Revisiting Proportionality Analysis and the Standard of Review 
of Investor-State Arbitration, 15 J. INT’L ECON. L. 223, 223–55 (2012) (arguing for a more deferential 
application of proportionality review taking into account “host state authorities’ greater 
democratic legitimacy and proximity to host state communities, and tribunals’ comparatively weak 
institutional capacity”).  For a broader discussion of possible reforms, see UNITED NATIONS 
CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2013 – 
GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS: INVESTING FOR DEVELOPMENT 110, 110–20 (2014) (mapping five paths 
to reform of investment arbitration); UNTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2014: INVESTMENT 
IN THE SDGS: AN ACTION PLAN 126, 126–33 (2015) (mapping pro-sustainable development goals 
approaches to investment law reform).   
 63 Investment Chapter, supra note 10. 
 64 Eli Lilly & Co. v. The Gov’t of Canada, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration 
under NAFTA (Nov. 7, 2012), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw11 
72.pdf [hereinafter Notice of Intent]. 
15
Baker and Geddes: Corporate Power Unbound: Investorstate Arbitration of IP Monopoli
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2015
16 J. INTELL. PROP. L.  [Vol. 23:1 
 
asset expropriation and adjudicative injustice.  Larcenous and lawless 
governments would be deterred from confiscating hard-earned foreign 
investments and become compliant with, or at least obedient, to the rule of law.  
In the context of a global development agenda, investment clauses were 
believed to provide a level of security that would incentivize foreign direct 
investment in the real economy and financial markets of low- and middle-
income countries thereby accelerating the development of comparative 
advantage and lubricating participation in the expanding global economy.65  A 
total of 3,271 international investment agreements (IIAs) were concluded 
between 1980 and 2014, of which almost 90% were bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs).66  The resulting complex web of agreements allows investors to shop 
for investment provisions that are most advantageous to them and, if necessary, 
set up a subsidiary for the purpose of asserting a preferred protected foreign 
status.  Alternatively, most favored nation rules permit an investor to argue that 
it is entitled to the benefit of the “best” investment clause protections that have 
been granted to investors from any other state.67 
Although modern investment clauses and investor-state dispute resolution 
have existed since the 1950s, their use was limited during their first fifty years as 
only fifty investor-state claims were filed.68  Although records are scarce, 
investors seem to have reserved their claims for those exceptional cases where 
hard investments were nationalized or transferred to others without 
compensation.69  In contrast, since 2001, six hundred and eight known investor-
state disputes have been filed.70  Investors had won only $3 billion from 
                                                                                                                   
 65 Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to 
Developing Countries?, 33 WORLD DEV. 1567 (2005). 
 66 UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT: REFORMING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
GOVERNANCE 106 (2015), available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf. 
 67 UNCTAD, MOST-FAVOURED NATION TREATMENT (2010), available at http://unctad.org/ 
en/DOCS/diaeia20101_en.pdf; Pia Acconci, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino & 
Christoph Schreuer eds., 2008).  
 68 UNCTAD, IIA Issues Note: Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement 3 (2012), 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaeia2012d10_en.pdf.  The history of protecting 
international investments is much longer than the history of bilateral investments treaties.  See 
KENNETH J. VANDEVELD, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: HISTORY, POLICY, AND 
INTERPRETATION, at Ch. 2 (Oxford University Press, New York, 2010). 
 69 Six such cases, decided in the early 2000s, were based on direct expropriation claims.  
Roderick Abbot, Frerik Erixon & Martina Francesca Ferracane, DEMYSTIFYING INVESTOR-STATE 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, ECIPE Occasional Paper No. 5, at 14 (2014).  
 70 UNCTAD, IIA Issues Note – Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Review of Developments in 2014, at 2 
(2015), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/UNCTAD_WEB_DIAE_ 
PCB_2015_%202%20IIA%20ISSUES%20NOTESMAY%20evening.pdf.  See Table of Foreign 
Investor-State Cases and Claims under NAFTA and Other U.S. Trade Deals, PUBLIC CITIZEN (2015), 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/investor-state-chart.pdf.  The fact that an investor-state 
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taxpayers in arbitral awards before last year, but a stunning $50 billion was 
awarded in 2014 in three closely related arbitrations involving stakeholders in 
the former petroleum company Yukos and the Russian Federation.71  The 
amount claimed in ISDS cases in 2014 ranged from $8 million to $2.5 billion.72  
Moreover, the average cost of arbitral proceedings is nearly $8 million, although 
the Philippines’s tribunal costs and legal costs in a single case exceeded $50 
million.73   
This sea change in investor-state claims was triggered by the belated 
realization that not only could investors bring claims against banana-republic 
confiscations but also against emerging economies and even advanced 
democracies whenever their expectations of profit were thwarted by shifting 
government regulations, adverse adjudicative decisions or other state 
practices.74  Accordingly, foreign corporations have used investor-state dispute 
resolution to challenge a broad array of environmental and land use laws, 
government procurement decisions, regulatory permitting decisions, financial 
regulations, consumer protection laws, public health provisions, public safety 
laws, and a range of other public interest policies.75  Claims in extractive 
industries are common.  For example, Churchill Mining has filed a $2 billion 
claim against Indonesia relating to its mining regulations.76  ICSID recently 
ordered Ecuador to pay Occidental Petroleum $1.8 billion in a disagreement 
over an oil concession contract in the largest investor-state award to date.77  
Claims relating to environmental and public health hazards are also common.  
                                                                                                                   
arbitral award has been issued does not necessarily mean that it has yet been paid.  However, $380 
million has been paid out to investors under U.S. FTAs and these are only a subset of investor-
state awards.  Many arbitral claims are settled, post-award, and others are enforced by being 
reduced to a court judgment that can thereafter be executed against state property, subject to 
some foreign sovereign immunity issues.  See Vincent O. Nmehielle, Enforcing Arbitration Awards 
Under the International Covenant for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention), 7 ANN. 
SURVEY INT’L & COMP. L. 21, 21–48 (2001).  According to a 2008 PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
study, host states have complied with about 90% of investment arbitration awards rendered 
against them.  See International Arbitration: Corporate attitudes and practices, ACADEMIA (2008), 
available at http://www.academia.edu/262767/PricewaterhouseCoopers_International_Arbitratio 
n_Corporate_Attitudes_and_Practices.   
 71 Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Review of Developments in 2014, UNCTAD (2014), available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/nebdiaepcb2015d2_end.pdf. 
 72 UNCTAD, IIA ISSUES NOTE, RECENT TRENDS IN IIAS AND ISDS No. 1 (Feb. 2015), 
available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2015d1_en.pdf. 
 73 EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 57, at 7.   
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Churchill Mining PLC v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/14 (2015), 
available at http://www.italaw.com/cases/1479.  
 77 UNCTAD, Recent developments in investor-state dispute settlement, IIA Issues Note (May 2013), 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d3_en.pdf. 
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One prominent public health example is the arbitral claim against Australia 
under a 1993 Australia-Hong Kong bilateral investment treaty brought by a 
subsidiary of Phillip Morris International (PMI) challenging plain packaging 
restrictions on tobacco products.78  PMI pursued its 2011 arbitral claim despite 
the Australian High Court’s confirmation of the constitutionality of the 
Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011.79 Fortunately, in December 2015, the 
arbitral tribunal declined jurisdiction to hear the case, emboldening other 
countries to proceed with stalled plain packaging legislation.80  
In the infamous Metalclad v. Mexico case, a U.S. toxic waste disposal firm 
challenged a Mexican city’s refusal to grant a construction permit for a toxic 
waste facility until and unless the firm cleaned up pre-existing toxic waste 
problems of which it was aware when it purchased the property from a previous 
polluter.  In an earlier instance, Canada reversed an environmental ban on the 
gasoline additive MMT, a probable carcinogen, after U.S. Ethyl Corporation 
filed a NAFTA investor-state claim against it.81  More recently, in another 
environmental case involving Canada, Bilcon v. Canada, Canada’s effort to thwart 
a mining and marine terminal project because it would violate “core community 
values” was found to have violated the minimum standards of treatment rule in 
NAFTA.82  Bilcon is seeking $300 million in compensation from Canada. 
In 2008, the government of El Salvador refused to issue mining permits to 
Canadian gold mining company Pacific Rim, in order to protect local 
communities from the contamination of water supplies with chemicals such as 
arsenic.83  Pacific Rim then launched an investor-state dispute against El 
Salvador for $315 million for the loss of anticipated future profits.84  Pacific 
                                                                                                                   
 78 See Tania Voon, Acquisition of Intellectual Property Rights: Australia’s Plain Tobacco Packaging 
Dispute, 2 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 113 (2013); Patricia Ranald, The Australian High Court tobacco 
plain packaging decision and Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), Paper presented at the 
Stakeholders Forum, Fourteenth round of Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations in Leesburg, 
Virginia (Sept. 9, 2012), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/105755455/Investor-state-Disp 
utes-Settlement-and-the-TPP-Patricia-Ranald.  
 79 JT International SA v. Commonwealth of Australia; British American Tobacco Australasia 
Limited v. Commonwealth of Australia, [2012] HCA 43 (Austl.). 
 80 Daniel Hurst, Australia wins international legal battle with Philip Morris over plain packaging, THE 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/dec/18/australi 
a-wins-international-legal-battle-with-philip-morris-over-plain-packaging. 
 81 See NAFTA – Chapter 11 – Investment:  Cases Filed Against the Government of Canada:  Ethyl 
Corporation v. Government of Canada, available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-ac 
cords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/ethyl.aspx?lang=eng. 
 82 Bilcon v. Canada (U.S. v. Canada) (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015), available at http://www.italaw.com/c 
ases/documents/2984. 
 83 THOMAS MCDONAGH, THE DEMOCRACY CENTER, UNFAIR, UNSUSTAINABLE AND UNDER 
THE RADAR (2013), available at http://democracyctr.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Und 
er_The_Radar_English_Final.pdf. 
 84 Id. 
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Rim’s U.S. subsidiary brought the claim within the scope of the Central 
American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and the ISDS clause contained 
within that treaty.85  The ongoing claim has attracted the attention of more than 
300 NGOs, trade unions, and civil society groups who vow to defend every last 
“drop of water”86 in a country where approximately 1.5 million rural inhabitants 
lack access to reliable water sources.87 
In 2010, U.S.-owned The Renco Group, Inc. filed a notice of intent to 
commence arbitration against the Peruvian government for denying it a third 
opportunity to clean up over a decade’s worth of pollution from its metal 
smelter in La Oroya.88  The Peruvian government shut down the metal smelter 
after Renco’s persistent delay in implementing environmental improvements.89 
Many of La Oroya’s children suffered from elevated lead levels and displayed 
symptoms consistent with lead poisoning, including anemia, convulsions, 
stunted growth and mental retardation.90  Renco responded by bringing an 
investor-state dispute against Peru under the 2009 U.S.-Peru FTA, demanding 
$800 million in compensation for Peru’s alleged “unfair treatment” of Renco’s 
smelter-operating subsidiary.91  The threat of expensive and protracted 
arbitration forced the Peruvian government to permit renewed operation of the 
smelter without pollution-capturing devices.  This renewed smelting has already 
produced reports of fresh emissions.92  Peru’s inability to protect the health of 
its own people demonstrates the devastating impact that investor-state disputes 
can have on public health. 
In 2011, Germany’s decision to shut down its nuclear power industry in the 
wake of Fukushima triggered a multi-billion dollar claim by Swedish energy 
                                                                                                                   
 85 Carey L. Biron, World Bank Tribunal Weighs Final Arguments in El Salvador Mining Dispute, IPS 
NEWS AGENCY (Sept. 16, 2014), available at http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/09/world-bank-tribu 
nal-weighs-final-arguments-in-el-salvador-mining-dispute/. 
 86 Claire Provost, El Salvador groups accuse Pacific Rim of “assault on democratic governance,” THE 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/apr/10/el-
salvador-pacific-rim-assault-democratic-governance. 
 87 Denis Collins, The Failure of a Socially Responsive Gold Mining MNC in El Salvador: Ramifications 
of NGO Mistrust, 88 J. BUS. ETHICS 245, 245–68 (2009). 
 88 The Renco Grp., Inc. v. The Republic of Peru, Claimant’s Notice of Intent to Commence 
Arbitration Under United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (2010), available at http:// 
italaw.com/documents/RencoGroupVPeru_NOI.pdf. 
 89 Lori Wallach, Brewing Storm over ISDS Clouds Trans-Pacific Partnership Talks, KLUWER 
ARBITRATION BLOG (Feb. 29, 2016, 9:05 AM), http://sensiblesafeguards.org/assets/documents/ 
kluwerblog-with-endnotes.pdf. 
 90 Andrew Martin, Coup d’Etat to Trade Seen in Billionaire Toxic Lead Fight, BLOOMBERG (May 10, 
2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-05-09/rennert-800-million-toxic-lead-fig 
ht-roils-global-trade. 
 91 The Renco Grp., Inc. v. The Republic of Peru, supra note 88. 
 92 Public Citizen, Renco Uses U.S.-Peru FTA to Evade Justice for La Oroya Pollution (Dec. 2012), 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/renco-la-oroya-memo.pdf. 
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company Vattenfall, which operates two nuclear plants in Germany: Krümmel 
and Brunsbüttel.93  Vattenfall demanded compensation of $4.7 billion under the 
ISDS clause of the Energy Charter Treaty.94  The ability of a foreign investor to 
hold a national government hostage over legislation designed to protect the 
health of its citizens highlights the extraordinary anti-democratic precedent set 
by investor-state disputes.  ISDS provisions provide foreign nationals with 
greater rights than domestic citizens by virtue of their ability to bring treaty 
claims.  Consequently, “the rights provided to foreign investors surpass the 
protections enshrined in Germany’s basic law” which carefully balances public 
welfare objectives and investor rights.95  While the public interest is a guiding 
principle in Grundgesetz, it may be completely ignored by an international 
investment tribunal whose priorities lie with investors.96  
Although many investor-state cases implicate public health and safety, prior 
to 2012, no pharmaceutical company had filed an investor-state challenge based 
on intellectual property rights.  That moratorium ended on 7 November 2012,97 
when Eli Lilly and Company initiated arbitration proceedings under the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) investment clause to attack 
Canada’s invalidation of a patent on an attention deficit disorder medicine 
called Stattera.98  In doing so, Eli Lilly is challenging a well-established patent 
rule in Canada, the so-called promise doctrine, whereby a medicine’s “utility,” 
and thus patentability, must be demonstrated or soundly predicted at the time 
of filing a patent.99  Eli Lilly has made a number of specific investment chapter 
claims including an allegation that the Canadian ruling involved a violation of 
                                                                                                                   
 93 The Arbitration Game, ECONOMIST (Oct. 11, 2014), available at http://www.economist.com/ 
news/finance-and-economics/21623756-governments-are-souring-treaties-protect-foreign-invest 
ors-arbitration. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Natalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder & Rhea Tamara Hoffmann, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE 
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT [IISO], The German Nuclear Phase-Out Put to the Test in 
International Investment Arbitration? Background to the new dispute Vattenfall v. Germany (II) (2012), 
http://www.tni.org/files/download/vattenfall-icsid-case_oct2013.pdf. 
 96 Id.  
 97 Notice of Intent, supra note 64. 
 98 The challenged court decision is Eli Lilly Co. v. Teva Canada Ltd., 2011 FAC 220.  The 
investor-state claim is Eli Lilly v. Canada, supra note 6.  Chapter 11 of NAFTA adopted investor-
state arbitration.  North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 
I.L.M. 259 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994).  Eli Lilly initiated an IP-related claim despite the fact 
that intellectual property rights are not directly defined as covered investments in Article 1139. 
 99 See E. Richard Gold & Michael Shortt, The Promise of the Patent in Canada and Around the World, 
30 CAN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 35 (2014) (presenting a comprehensive review of the long history of 
the promise doctrine in Canadian and British jurisprudence and kindred utility doctrine in other 
jurisdictions). 
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minimum standards of treatment, indirect expropriation, and discrimination.100  
The analysis below will first address the provisions in the Investment Chapter 
and their theoretical risk to access to medicines and then examine those risks in 
light of the actual claims asserted by Eli Lilly against Canada. 
IV.  THE TPPA INVESTMENT CHAPTER IS A BOOBY-TRAP FOR ACCESS TO 
MEDICINES 
The TPPA IP Chapter has been analyzed briefly above with respect to the 
dangers it poses in terms of access to medicines101 and elsewhere with respect 
to its IP enforcement provisions.102  An earlier leaked version of the TPPA 
Investment Chapter103 has also been closely analyzed primarily with respect to 
the generic dangers of its extra-judicial investor-state dispute settlement 
provisions.104  Our analysis expands on other investor-state critiques and 
focuses on the particular risks the Investment Chapter poses with respect to 
access to medicines, especially in light of the direct and indirect inclusion of 
IPRs in the Chapter’s coverage.  These risks are cumulative to existing IP 
enforcement risks and burdens because investor-state dispute resolution offers 
unique remedies beyond enhanced private enforcement mechanisms 
(mandatory injunctions and expanded damages) and beyond heightened 
enforcement undertakings by governments (state-state dispute resolution, 
border measures, and criminal enforcement).  In essence, the inclusion of 
intellectual property rights granted in the TPPA IP Chapter gives IP-“investors” 
new substantive “investment rights” that they could now directly, selectively, 
and cumulatively enforce against sovereign governments’ regulations, policies, 
                                                                                                                   
 100 Eli Lilly v. Canada, supra note 6. 
 101 See supra notes 36–46 and accompanying text. 
 102 Lise Johnson & Lisa Sachs, The TPP’s Investment Chapter:  Entrenching, rather than reforming, a flawed 
system, Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Policy Paper (November 2015), available at 
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/11/TPP-entrenching-flaws-21-Nov-FINAL.pdf; Amokura 
Kawharu, TPPA: Chapter 9 on Investment, Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement New Zealand Expert 
Paper Series No. 2 (2015), available at https://tpplegal.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/ep2-amokura-
kawharu.pdf; Public Citizen, Secret TPP Investment Chapter Unveiled:  It’s Worse than We Thought (2015), 
available at https://www.citizen.org/documents/analysis-tpp-investment-chapter-november-2015. 
pdf. 
 103 Investment Chapter, supra note 10. 
 104 See, e.g., Lori Wallach & Todd Tucker, Public Interest Analysis of Leaked Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) Investment Text (June 13, 2012), http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/wp-content/uploads/20 
12/06/gtwtppinvestmentanalysis.pdf; Jane Kelsey, New TPP Leaked Text: National Says ‘Yes’ to 
Investor Rights to Sue, SCOOP (June 14, 2012), http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PO1206/S00186/ 
national-says-yes-to-investor-rights-to-sue.htm; Lori Wallach & Ben Beachy, Analysis of Leaked 
Trans-Pacific Partnership Investment Text (Mar. 25, 2015), http://citizen.org/documents/tpp-investm 
ent-leak-2015.pdf.   
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and adjudicatory decisions using the Investment Chapter’s investor-state 
dispute resolution.   
There are five main dangers in the Investment Chapter that threaten access 
to medicines: 
•  First, the minimum standard of treatment rule, including 
fair and equitable treatment, and the indirect 
expropriation standard contain significant ambiguities 
that could greatly restrict countries’ ability to enact, use, 
and defend lawful flexibilities that enhance access to 
medicines.   
•  Second, national treatment and most favored nation 
provisions can be interpreted to prevent unanticipated 
forms of alleged discrimination against foreign investors. 
•  Third, it is dangerous to cross-reference and incorporate 
IP rights into the investment chapter, given the extensive 
private and public enforcement rights that rightholders 
already possess and given drug companies’ proclivities to 
bring lawsuits against governments.105   
•  Fourth, the bracketed limited exception to IP-related 
investment rights for compulsory licenses and patenting 
decisions does not provide the security against investor 
claims that TPPA Parties would need to truly safeguard 
lawful measures that promote access to affordable 
                                                                                                                   
 105 Using India as an example, Bayer unsuccessfully sued India to achieve judicially mandated 
patent-registration linkage.  Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, 41 P.T.C. 634 (Del. 2009); Bayer Corp. 
v. Union of India, 9 Feb. 2010, LPA 443/2009; Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) 
No(s) 6540/2010; see Mabel Tsui, Access to Medicine and the Dangers of Patent Linkage: Lessons from 
Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, 18 J.L. & MED. 577 (2011); Anshul Mittal, Patent Linkage in India: 
Current Scenario and Need for Deliberation, 15 J. INTEL. PROP. RGTS. 187 (2010).  Bayer appealed the 
granting of a compulsory license on its cancer medicine, Nexavar (sorfenib tosylate) but lost and 
further review was denied.  Samanwaya Rautray, Nexavar Licence Case: SC dismisses Bayer’s appeal 
against HC decision, ECON. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2014), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2 
014-12-13/news/57012244_1_bayer-s-compulsory-licence-glivec.  Novartis unsuccessfully sued 
India in 2006 to invalidate Section 3(d) of the Indian Amended (2005) Patents Act on the 
grounds that it was unconstitutional and violated the TRIPS Agreement.  See Shamnad Basheer & 
Prashant Reddy, “Ducking” TRIPS In India: A Saga Involving Novartis and the Legality of Section 3(d), 20 
NAT’L L. SCH. INDIA REV. 131 (2008).  Novartis appealed the underlying denial of a patent on its 
cancer medicine, Glivec all the way to the Supreme Court of India, which dismissed Novartis’s 
effort to obtain a patent on Glivec and to reinterpret section 3(d) of the India Patents Act to 
make it easier to evergreen patents on medicines.  Novartis v. Government of India, Civil Appeal Nos. 
2706–2716 of 2013 (Apr. 1, 2013), available at http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/outtoday/pate 
nt.pdf.  
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medicines for all, as set forth in the TRIPS Agreement 
and further clarified in the Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.106   
•  Fifth, the Investment Chapter prevents certain 
performance requirements that in the IP context might 
give developing countries leeway to develop domestic 
pharmaceutical capacity in order to ensure a self-
sufficient and uninterrupted supply of medicines and to 
promote industrial development and diversification. 
A.  THE “MINIMUM STANDARD OF TREATMENT/FAIR AND EQUITABLE 
TREATMENT” STANDARD AND INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION STANDARD 
CONTAIN DANGEROUS INTERPRETIVE AMBIGUITIES THAT COULD 
NEGATIVELY IMPACT GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND DECISIONS AFFECTING 
ACCESS TO MEDICINES 
Article 9.6.1 of the TPPA Investment Chapter requires that, as a “minimum 
standard of treatment,” “Each Party shall accord to covered investments 
treatment in accordance with applicable customary international law principles, 
including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.”107  
Although subparagraph 1 does not require treatment in addition to or beyond 
that required by customary international law, Article 9.6.2(a) interprets “fair and 
equitable treatment” to include “the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, 
civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the 
principle of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the 
world.”108 Articles 9.6.3–5 corral the reach of the minimum standard of 
treatment rule: (1) Article 9.6.3 clarifies that breach of a separate provision of 
the TPPA or of a separate international agreement does not by itself establish a 
minimum standard breach; (2) Article 9.6.4 states that the mere fact that a 
parties actions or inactions are inconsistent with an investor’s expectation does 
not necessarily constitute a breach; and (3) Article 9.6.5 clarifies that the mere 
fact that a subsidy or grant has not been issued, renewed, or maintained, or that 
it has been modified or reduced, does not necessary constitute a breach.109  
                                                                                                                   
 106 Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Ministerial Conference, Fourth 
Session, Doha, Nov. 9–14, 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 20, 2001), http://www.wto.org/ 
english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/min01_e.htm [hereinafter Doha Declaration].   
 107 Investment Chapter, supra note 10. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id.  
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However, the effectiveness of these provisions to limit increasing investor 
reliance on the minimum standard of treatment has been sharply questioned.110 
Investor-state tribunals have used increasingly expansive interpretations of 
the “minimum standard of treatment” rule that depart further and further from 
the “customary international law” actually practiced by States, despite an annex 
defining customary international law as the “general and consistent practice of 
States that they follow from a sense of legal obligation.”111  Indeed, in the recent 
ruling on the Railroad Development Corporation v. Republic of Guatemala case, an 
investor-state tribunal explicitly rejected arguments that the minimum standard 
of treatment for foreign investors needed to be based on state practice, opting 
instead to borrow a more expansive interpretation of the standard from another 
tribunal.112  
That more elastic interpretation of the minimum standard of treatment came 
from the 2004 NAFTA case known as Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican 
States II.113  In its award, the tribunal defined a violation of the minimum 
standard of treatment as entailing state conduct that is “arbitrary, grossly unfair, 
unjust or idiosyncratic, is discriminatory and exposes the claimant to sectional 
or racial prejudice, or involves a lack of due process leading to an outcome 
which offends judicial propriety.”114  The tribunal noted that this might be the 
case where there has been a “manifest failure of natural justice in judicial 
proceedings or a complete lack of transparency and candor in an administrative 
process.”115  More problematically, the tribunal decided that if a state breaches 
“representations” that were “reasonably relied on” by investors at the time of 
investment, that breach constitutes evidence of unfair or inequitable conduct 
that violates the minimum standard of treatment.116  Some commentators, citing 
other expansive tribunal decisions, argue that the minimum standard of 
treatment goes so far as to protect the “reasonable expectations” of an investor 
                                                                                                                   
 110 Johnson & Sachs, supra note 102, at 4–6; Public Citizen, supra note 102, at 10; Kawharu, 
supra note 102, at 10–12. 
 111 Investment Chapter, supra note 10, Annex 9-A. For a chronology of tribunals’ elastic 
interpretations of the minimum standard of treatment, see Public Citizen, Memorandum on “Fair and 
Equitable Treatment” and Investors’ Reasonable Expectations: Rulings in U.S. FTAs & BITs Demonstrate 
FET Definition Must be Narrowed (Sept. 5, 2012), http://www.citizen.org/documents/MST-
Memo.pdf?iframe=true&width=100% &height=100% (detailing a chronology of tribunals’ elastic 
interpretations of the minimum standard of treatment). 
 112 See Public Citizen, Railroad Development Corporation (RDC) v. Guatemala, http://www.citizen. 
org/RDC-vs-Guatemala#!prettyPhoto[iframe]/0/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2015) (describing the 
expansive view of the minimum standard). 
 113 Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. United Mexican States, Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award (ICSID Apr. 
30, 2004), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/34643.pdf.  
 114 Id. ¶ 98. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
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even in the absence of direct representations, let alone binding commitments 
allowing unfettered and immutable market participation or profit-making 
opportunities.117  Such expansive interpretations of the “minimum standard of 
treatment” have made these claims an investor favorite.  In nearly 75% of the 
investor-state cases won under U.S. trade and investment agreements, the 
tribunal cited a “minimum standard” violation to rule against the respondent 
party.118  
In the pharmaceutical context, foreign investors might claim that the 
“minimum standard of treatment” rule covers their reasonable expectations for 
future profits arising from the granting or even filing of intellectual property 
claims.  Changing or re-interpreting substantive IP standards or guidelines 
judicially, administratively deciding pre- or post-grant patent oppositions in 
favor of challengers, or adjudicating exceptions to granted rights might all be 
interpreted as violations of minimum standards of treatment.  In sum, 
whenever foreign IP rightholders disagree with judicial or administrative 
decisions or view those decisions as insufficiently transparent or candid, the 
foreign rightholder could potentially bring investment chapter claims directly 
against that government without ever being required to exhaust appeal 
mechanisms.   
These concerns are no longer purely speculative.  A major international 
corporate law firm, Jones Day, has directly counseled pharmaceutical 
companies about foreign investor claims they might bring against India: 
[T]he basic patentability standards of the TRIPs agreement have 
been guaranteed to Novartis’ investments in India ever since 
India agreed to become TRIPs-compliant in 2005; denying a 
patent in violation of those standards therefore may constitute a 
violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard.  In Bayer’s 
case, the sheer length of time for which the compulsory license 
was granted to the Indian company—i.e., the “balance term of 
the patent”—and the fact that no national health “emergency” 
exists to justify such a license over a “non-life saving drug,” are 
                                                                                                                   
 117 See FIONA MARSHALL, INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, FAIR AND EQUITABLE 
TREATMENT IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (Oct. 1–2, 2007), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/inv_fair_treatme 
nt.pdf.  
 118 See Wallach & Tucker, supra note 104, at 8. 
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just two reasons to suggest that India has run afoul of Article 31 
of TRIPs.119 
The Novartis v. India case120 involved the denial of an evergreening patent on 
Glivec, an important cancer medicine.  The Bayer case referred to involves 
India’s first grant of a compulsory license, also on a cancer medicine. What’s 
striking about Jones Day’s advice is its legal inaccuracy.  Although TRIPS 
Article 31 does allow patent holders to seek termination of a compulsory license 
when the conditions giving rise to that license have abated, there is no stated 
limitation in TRIPS on the duration of a license.  Even more clearly, Article 31 
contains no requirement whatsoever that compulsory licenses on medicines 
only be granted for “emergencies” or that they are limited to lifesaving 
medicines.  Compulsory licenses under TRIPS can be granted for non-
emergency conditions routinely, but unlike licenses granted in emergencies or 
for public, non-commercial use or to remedy anti-competitive behavior such 
licenses require an attempt to negotiate a voluntary license with the patent 
holder on reasonable terms.  Likewise, compulsory licenses can be granted on 
medicines that respond to any health need, not just life-saving need.  Both of 
these points were directly addressed and clarified in the Doha Declaration.121  
Article 9.8 of the TPPA Investment Chapter also prohibits direct and 
“indirect expropriation” of a covered investment, which includes failure to pay 
fair market value upon expropriation.122  Although there is an exception in 
subparagraph 5 with respect to “compulsory licenses granted in relation to 
intellectual property rights in accordance with the TRIPS Agreement,” this 
exception would not appear to cover exceptions to data exclusivity or patent-
registration linkage rights nor many other patent related claims.  Even the last 
portion of subparagraph 5, which includes an exception to the expropriation 
rule for “the revocation, limitation, or creation of intellectual property rights, to 
the extent that such issuance, revocation, limitation, or creation is consistent 
with Chapter 18 (Intellectual Property) and the TRIPS Agreement,”123 as 
important as it may be, might not give rights to create novel exceptions to 
                                                                                                                   
 119 Jones Day Commentary, Treaty Protection for Global Patents: A Response to a Growing Problem for 
Multinational Pharmaceutical Companies 3 (Jones Day Oct. 2012), http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publ 
ication/96b88f45-3c81-4e6e-b640-9ca243920ad5/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/523d7608-c 
58a-4bab-bd96-9e1d121287ea/Treaty%20Protection.pdf; see also Viren Mascarenhas & Giulia 
Previti, Use Investment Treaties to Protect your Right, MANAGING IP, 42 (Sept. 2013), http://www.manag 
ingip.com/Article/3248510/Use-investment-treaties-to-protect-your-rights.html.   
 120 See supra note 105. 
 121 See Doha Declaration, supra note 106, ¶ 5. 
 122 Investment Chapter, supra note 10. 
 123 Id.  It is important to note that the exception in Article 9.8.5 applies only to expropriate 
claims and not to minimum standard of treatment claims or discrimination claims. 
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intellectual property rights in the absence of full remuneration.  Pursuant to the 
indirect expropriation rule, it would be unlawful, arguably, to create a new 
public health exception to data exclusivity or to require disclosure of the 
international proprietary name of active pharmaceutical ingredients on 
medicine-related patents.  Likewise, payment of partial liability awards or 
royalties would not suffice to escape indirect expropriation strictures.  Finally, 
the subparagraph 5 language would not prevent the foreign IP-investor from 
advancing even more fanciful interpretations of what is “inconsistent” with the 
IP Chapter as evidenced by the Eli Lilly v. Canada investor complaint. 
Possible meanings of indirect expropriation are addressed further in Annex 
9-B, and clarify the imperative to protect investor expectations, by requiring a 
case-by-case, fact-based inquiry of the following subparagraph 3(a) factors: 
(i)  the economic impact of the government action, although 
the fact that an action or series of actions by a Party has an 
adverse effect on the economic value of an investment, standing 
alone, does not establish that an indirect expropriation has 
occurred;  
(ii) the extent to which government action interferes with 
distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations; and  
(iii) the character of the government action.124 
Footnote 36 in Annex 9-B places some restrictions on which investment-
backed expectations are reasonable, saying that the determination depends “on 
factors such as whether the government provided the investor with binding 
written assurances and the nature and extent of government regulation or the 
potential for government regulation in the relevant sector.”125  Subparagraph 
3(b) also sets some loose boundaries on investor expectations: “Non-
discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to 
protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and 
the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations, except in rare 
circumstances.”126  Although this public welfare exception and its public health 
clarification may be helpful, it is not an absolute privilege.  Investors can claim: 
(1) that their cases are the rare ones where even non-discriminatory regulation 
                                                                                                                   
 124 Id. (emphasis added).   
 125 Id. 
 126 Id.  Footnote 37 in Annex 9-B further clarified that regulatory actions to protect public 
health “include, among others, such measures with respect to the regulation, pricing and supply 
of, and reimbursement for, pharmaceuticals (including biological products), diagnostics, vaccines, 
medical devices, gene therapies and technologies, health-related aids and appliances and blood 
and blood-related products.” 
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constitutes indirect expropriation; (2) that the regulatory actions are 
discriminatory, e.g., targeted solely at or disproportionately applied to 
pharmaceutical investors; or (3) that the interests being protected are not 
legitimate.  They can, of course, also claim that their IP rights have been 
violated. 
To give concrete examples, if a compulsory license were granted on a 
medicine pursuant to the TRIPS/health solution,127 would that be deemed 
confiscatory?  Some commentators have suggested that compulsory licenses in 
general should be considered an expropriation, while others disagree,128 but 
what if the compulsory license displeased the foreign patent holder’s legal 
sensitivities in some regard?  To use another example, if a compulsory licensing 
regime were to have a local working requirement—as is true in India and 
Brazil129—a foreign pharmaceutical investor might claim that this objective was 
a rare, challengeable circumstance, or evidence of discriminatory bias in favor of 
domestic firms, or that local working requirements violate TRIPS Article 27.1 
by discriminating against imports.  Likewise, if ostensibly neutral compulsory 
licensing rights were used more routinely to grant pharmaceutical-related 
licenses, as recently occurred in Indonesia with seven different hepatitis and 
antiretroviral medicines,130 the pharmaceutical investor might claim field-of-
technology “discrimination” in violation of Article 27.1.  Finally, if the royalty 
rate did not adequately compensate for lost profits from a drug company’s 
perspective, especially in comparison to the much higher absolute value of 
royalty rates in commercial transactions, the compulsory license might be 
deemed confiscatory.131   
                                                                                                                   
 127 A special waiver was adopted by the WTO on August 6, 2003, providing for compulsory 
licenses permitting export/import of unlimited exportation of specified quantities of particular 
medicines when the importing country has insufficient manufacturing capacity to operationalize a 
domestic compulsory license.  Baker, supra note 30.  Although an amendment based on the 
Paragraph 6 waiver was proposed in 2005, Article 31bis, it has not yet been ratified by sufficient 
number of WTO members to become effective.  I use this example because even though a 
compulsory license exception is proposed in the Investment Chapter it is not clear that Paragraph 
6 System licenses would be judged to have been issued “in accordance with the TRIPS 
Agreement.” 
 128 Compare Peter B. Rutledge, TRIPS and BITS: An Essay on Compulsory Licenses, Expropriation, and 
International Arbitration, 13 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 149 (2012), with Christopher Gibson, A Look at the 
Compulsory License in Investment Arbitration: The Case of Indirect Expropriation, 25 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 
357 (2010). 
 129 India Patents Act, § 84(1)(c); Brazil Law No. 9.279, of May 14, 1996, Art. 68. 
 130 Public Citizen, Breaking News: Indonesia Licenses Patents for Seven HIV & Hepatitis B Medicines – 
Precedent-Setting Government Order has Extraordinary Lifesaving Potential (2012), http://www.citizen. 
org/PC-statement-on-compulsory-licensing-in-Indonesia.  
 131 For a discussion of royalty rates, see James Love, Remuneration Guidelines for Non-Voluntary Use 
of a Patent on Medical Technologies, WHO HEALTH ECONOMICS AND DRUGS TCM SERIES NO. 18 
(2005), http://www.who.int/hiv/amds/WHOTCM2005.1_OMS.pdf.  
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Jones Day has practical advice for transnational drug companies with respect 
to such compulsory-license-based indirect expropriation claims: 
Because exclusivity is a central feature to an intellectual property 
asset like a patent, the grant of a compulsory license significantly 
devalues that asset, and thus arguably “ha[s] an effect equivalent 
to . . . [an] expropriation” under international law.  In that 
situation, “compensation . . . shall be equivalent to the value of 
the expropriated . . . investment immediately before the date on 
which such expropriation . . . became publicly known.”  A 
nominal 6 percent royalty—which Bayer received as 
compensation for the Nexavar compulsory license—may 
arguably fall below this threshold and give rise to an actionable 
claim for indirect expropriation.132  
Jones Day goes further and explains that the issuance of the Bayer 
compulsory license might also have denied Bayer effective means to protect its 
rights within the domestic legal system since it was not granted interlocutory 
injunctions against the production of generic medicines during the pendency of 
its appeals.133 
B.  FOREIGN INVESTORS’ RIGHTS TO NATIONAL TREATMENT AND TO THE 
BENEFIT OF MOST FAVORED NATION TREATMENT FACILITATE IMAGINATIVE 
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS 
Article 9.4 contains the relevant definitions of National Treatment: 
1.  Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party 
treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like 
circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the 
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, 
conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of 
investments in its territory. 
2.  Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment 
no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to 
investments in its territory of its own investors with respect to 
                                                                                                                   
 132 Jones Day Commentary, supra note 119, at 3 (citations omitted).  This claim by Jones Day is 
also far-fetched since compulsory licenses have been expressly authorized by international 
treaties, including the Paris Convention, since the late nineteenth century and compulsory 
licensing rules were enshrined in Indian law well before Bayer applied for its patent on Nexavar.  
Paris Convention, supra note 12, art. 5(a)(2). 
 133 Jones Day Commentary, supra note 119. 
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the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, 
conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of 
investments. (Emphases added)134 
In sum, national treatment prevents favoritism toward domestic investors 
compared to foreign investors.  On this ground, as Jones Day argues, 
compulsory licenses granted to domestic companies,135 especially pursuant to 
local manufacturing requirements, would violate national treatment as domestic 
generic firms would obtain investment advantages that the foreign originator 
firm lacks without a local manufacturing facility.136  Similarly, the denial or 
invalidation of a patent owned by a foreign inventor might result in a national 
treatment discrimination claim if domestic inventors were allegedly being 
treated more favorably in similar circumstances.   
Most-favored nation (MFN) treatment is defined in Article 9.5: 
1.  Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party 
treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like 
circumstances, to investors of any other Party or of any 
non-Party with respect to the establishment, acquisition, 
expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or 
other disposition of investments in its territory. 
2.  Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment 
no less favorable than that it accords, in like 
circumstances, to investments in its territory of investors 
of any other Party or of any non-Party with respect to the 
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, 
conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of 
investments. 
3.  For greater certainty, the treatment referred to in this 
Article does not encompass international dispute 
resolution procedures or mechanisms such as those 
                                                                                                                   
 134 Investment Chapter, supra note 10 (emphasis added). 
 135 Granting compulsory licenses to local firms is completely lawful under Article 31 of the 
TRIPS Agreement, though it is also lawful to issue a compulsory license to a foreign company 
and to import the medicine.  This importation strategy is easily pursued if there is no patent in the 
foreign country where the foreign licensee is located.  If there is a patent, a compulsory license 
would have to be issued to the same manufacturer by the exporting country.  See Brook K. Baker, 
Processes and Issues for Improving Access to Medicines: Willingness and Ability to Utilize TRIPS Flexibilities in 
Non-Producing Countries, U.K. DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, HEALTH 
SYSTEMS RESOURCE CENTRE (Aug. 2004), available at http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/do 
cs/Baker_TRIPS_Flex.pdf. 
 136 Jones Day Commentary, supra note 119, at 3.  
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included in Section B [referencing customary 
international law which arises from “a general and 
consistent practice of States that they follow from a sense 
of legal obligation”].137 
MFN allows investors to expand their rights beyond those negotiated in a 
particular treaty by shopping for better investment rights in other international 
investment agreements or in other kinds of agreements incorporated by 
reference into the Investment Chapter or related provisions.  Investors in the 
past have used MFN to seek better procedural treatment, expanded scope of 
protection, and stronger substantive rights.  For example, one type of right that 
might be available are the so-called pre-establishment rights.  These rights 
provide foreign investors with enforceable minimum guarantees of access to the 
market via removal of barriers to entry and a certain level of predictability, 
security, and transparency as to entry conditions.  In other words, pre-
establishment protections ensure that an investor can get its foot in the door.138  
This right is particularly important for foreign IP right holders who have a firm 
sense of entitlement once they have received a patent in a patent-friendly 
country like the U.S.  For example, to support its claim for patent protection in 
India on Glivec, Novartis made much of the fact that Glivec had been patented 
by “40 other countries.”139 
C.  THE IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT INCLUSION OF IP RIGHTS AS PROTECTED 
INVESTMENTS IS DEEPLY PROBLEMATIC WITH RESPECT TO MEDICINES 
The Article 9.1 definition of “investment” is broad enough to cover 
medicines-related intellectual property rights in that it only requires “commitment 
of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of 
risk.”140  Pharmaceutical inventions typically involve investment of capital or 
other resources during the research and development process.  Similarly, by 
granting rights to exclude others, IPRs certainly create an expectation of gain or 
profit—indeed an expectation of monopoly rents.  Accordingly, unless IP rights 
are expressly excluded from the investment chapter and from the definition of 
“investment,” there is a risk that IPRs, which routinely require both 
commitments of capital and an expectation of profit, would be implicitly 
                                                                                                                   
 137 Investment Chapter, supra note 10 (emphasis added). 
 138 See ANDREW PAUL NEWCOMBE, LLUIS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT 
TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 137–39 (Kluwer Law Int’l, the Netherlands, 2009). 
 139 FAQ on the Indian Glivec Patent Case, available at http://www.novartis.com/files/faq-on-
the-indian-glivec-patent-case.pdf.  
 140 Investment Chapter, supra note 10 (emphasis added). 
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covered.  In this regard, it is also important to point out that the definition of 
covered “investors” covers pre-establishment rights that arise even before the 
foreign investment has been made.141  
However, the Investment Chapter’s definition of investment goes further to 
explicitly reference: “intellectual property rights.”142  Protecting any and all 
intellectual property rights is problematic in at least five ways, given uncertainty 
about the intended breadth of its coverage:   
First, “intellectual property rights” will certainly be interpreted broadly to 
include all of the IPRs codified in the TRIPS Agreement, but the interpretation 
of certain flexibilities is contested.  For example, Article 6 prohibits resort to 
interstate dispute settlement with respect to IP exhaustion rules, but it does not 
directly permit or authorize international exhaustion, otherwise known as 
parallel importation.143  Accordingly, a disgruntled pharmaceutical company 
could very easily object to the importation and sale of a medicine it had sold 
more cheaply elsewhere claiming that parallel importation had violated its 
expectation of patent-based market segmentation and higher profits in certain 
markets.  It would not make sense for a private arbitral panel to decide such a 
complex issue.  
Secondly, not only might the vague and sometimes ambiguous language of 
TRIPS be interpreted expansively to justify an investor-state arbitral proceeding, 
but that same foreign IP investor might over-strenuously interpret the 
expanded IP rights conferred by the TPP itself.144  For example, a Party might 
decide that it has a public-health flexibility—and a human rights need—to enact 
an exception to TPP-based data exclusivity rights in the event of the issuance of 
a TRIPS- or TPP-compliant compulsory license.  The adversely affected 
“investor” might conclude that the express language of the TPPA IP chapter 
does not directly authorize such an exception and that the failure to pay total 
compensation as opposed to a mere royalty is an indirect expropriation.  
                                                                                                                   
 141 Id.  The definitions of investor of a party and investor of a non-Party in Article 9.1 both 
reference “an investor that attempts to make” an investment in a country.  Footnote 12 clarifies: 
For greater certainty, the Parties understand that . . . an investor ‘attempts to 
make’ an investment when that investor has taken concrete action or actions to 
make an investment, such as channeling resources or capital in order to set up a 
business, or applying for a permit or license.  
 142 Id. 
 143 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 6, “For the purposes of dispute settlement under this 
Agreement, subject to the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 nothing in this Agreement shall be used 
to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights.” 
 144 This possibility has strong support in another section of the Investment Chapter, which 
creates an exception with respect to remedies for direct or indirect expropriation pertaining to the 
revocation, limitation, or creation of intellectual property rights, to the extent that such issuance, 
revocation, limitation, or creation is consistent with the IP Chapter.  Investment Chapter, supra 
note 10, art. 9.7.5. 
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Alternatively, if the decision were adjudicatory, a failure to pay total 
compensation may be viewed as a violation of its reasonable expectations of 
absolute market exclusivity under Articles 18.50 or 18.52.  This latter, 
minimum-standard-of-treatment claim would be strengthened since there is 
currently little international state practice enacting exceptions to data exclusivity.  
Once again, a U.S.-based foreign investor would not need to convince the 
USTR to file a WTO or TPPA state-to-state dispute—it could do so 
unilaterally.  Moreover, it could bypass the Party’s judicial procedures and jump 
straight into pro-industry arbitral proceedings.  The company could safely 
assume that the revolving door justice of non-democratically selected 
arbitrators, who move seamlessly from representing IP rightholders, advising 
and representing governments, and donning the false cloak of arbitral neutrality, 
would prevail.  Worse yet, the mere threat of such a lawsuit could deter Parties 
from adopting lawful public health measures permitted by TRIPS because of 
the prohibitive costs of arbitral hearings and the risk of excessive judgment 
awards should they lose. 
Thirdly, a foreign pharmaceutical investor might simply rely on the TPPA-
compliant law of the TPPA Party and claim that its investor rights had been 
infringed by an adverse decision on a pending IP claim.  For example, despite 
the fact that the IP chapter requires countries to allow patents on new uses of 
existing medicines, a patent office might still conclude that a particular 
extension of an existing use lacks an inventive step.  The pharmaceutical 
company could argue that the TPPA-compliant national law actually creates a 
presumption in favor of the patentability of all new uses, including expansions 
of existing uses, providing an expectation of profit from exclusive rights on an 
evergreening patent.  Instead of challenging the denial of its secondary patent 
application in court, the company could bypass that step and immediately claim 
dilution of its putative—but not yet granted—IP rights and expectations of 
profit in investor-state arbitration. 
Fourthly, there is a risk that a foreign IP rightholder might bring claims 
based on what it considers to be inadequate enforcement, e.g., the failure to 
criminally prosecute a trademark counterfeiter because of scarce prosecutorial 
and judicial resources or a failure to impose the level of damages that the IP 
rightholder proposes.  Although the TRIPS Agreement mainly relies upon 
private enforcement—e.g., the creation of a procedurally fair judicial system for 
the private prosecution of IP infringement claims—the TPPA IP Chapter 
creates multiple new enforcement rights with respect to civil remedies, criminal 
sanctions, and border measures.  Failure to provide fair and equitable treatment 
in “criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with 
the principle of due process” constitutes an actionable minimum standard of 
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treatment violation.145  Paradoxically, a government could face foreign investor 
claims for failure to unilaterally enforce what are fundamentally private rights—
no longer could Parties use their TRIPS-compliant right not to prioritize 
publicly funded IP enforcement.146  Note as well, the cumulative nature of IP-
investors’ rights: (1) rightholders can bring private claims based on longer, 
broader, and more readily attainable patent rights and on new data exclusivity 
rights and they can obtain enhanced damages, injunctions, and seizure orders; 
(2) they can pursue stronger party-initiated border measures that could include 
seizures of goods in transit and rely on ex parte, sua sponte border measures by 
customs officials and seek criminal enforcement of trademarks and copyrights; 
(3) when frustrated, they can lobby for state-to-state dispute resolution under 
the TPPA; and (4) they can now challenge the state directly with investor-state 
dispute resolution.  Although IP right-holders already have unique and special 
enforcement rights under the TPP IP Chapter, they now receive even greater 
enforcement rights with investor-state arbitration. 
Fifthly, there is a risk that an IP rightholder might bring a claim because of a 
governmental failure to intercept alleged infringing products in-transit147 via 
stringent border measures.  This too might be interpreted to violate the right to 
fair and equitable treatment in administrative border procedures.  In the 
pharmaceutical context, drug companies have initiated seizures of medicines-in-
transit on multiple occasions in Europe, not because they violated IP rights in 
the countries of origin or destination, but because they interfered with fictional 
patent and trademark rights in the transit country.148  Contrary to what is 
required by TRIPS, TPPA border measures do not explicitly require that 
questions of infringement be considered from the perspective of the destination 
country.149   
                                                                                                                   
 145 Investment Chapter, supra note 10, art. 9.6.2(a).  
 146 Id. art. 41.5. 
 147 The IP Chapter expressly covers goods in transit, Art. 18.76.  Although the border measures 
rules do not directly cover patent or data rights, medicines can get caught up in border measures 
based on claims that they their names or markings are confusingly similar to a registered trademark.  
One such case involved the seizure of medicines bearing the international non-proprietary name 
amoxicillin, which German border agents considered to be confusingly similar to the brand name 
drug, Amoxil.  European Generic Drug Seizures Take Centre Stage at TRIPS Council Meeting, 13 BRIDGES 
WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG. 6, 6–7 (June 10, 2009), http://www.ictsd.org/bridg es-news/bridges/ 
news/european-generic-drug-seizures-take-centre-stage-at-trips-council-meeting.  
 148 See Request for Consultations by India, European Union – Seizure of Generic Drugs in 
Transit, WT/DS408 (May 11, 2011), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds 
408_e.htm; Request for Consultations by Brazil, European Union – Seizure of Generic Drugs in 
Transit, WT/DS409, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds409_e.htm.  
 149 Investment Chapters, supra note 10, art. 18.76.1. 
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D.  THE COMPULSORY LICENSING AND BRACKETED PATENTING EXCEPTIONS 
IN THE INVESTMENT CHAPTER ARE INSUFFICIENT TO PROTECT PARTIES’ 
LEGITIMATE INTERESTS TO ACCESS AFFORDABLE MEDICINES 
Subparagraph 1(f) of Art. 9.10 prohibits a TPPA Party from imposing or 
enforcing any investment-related requirement or enforcing any investment-
related commitment or undertaking “to transfer a particular technology, a 
production process, or other proprietary knowledge to a person in its 
territory.”150  This provision could arguably doom the right to issue compulsory 
or government use licenses.  To partially remedy this problem, subparagraph 
9.10.3(b)(i) eliminates this requirement where “a Party authorizes use of an 
intellectual property right in accordance with Articles 31 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, or to measures requiring the disclosure of proprietary information 
that fall within the scope of, and are consistent with, Article 39 of the TRIPS 
Agreement.”151  Similarly, with respect to Article 9.8, which prohibits the 
expropriation or nationalization of a covered investment either directly or 
indirectly, subparagraph 5 excludes Investment Chapter remedies for the 
issuance of compulsory licenses granted pursuant to the TRIPS Agreement or 
with respect “to the revocation, limitation, or creation of intellectual property 
rights, to the extent that such issuance, revocation, limitation, or creation is 
consistent with Chapter 18 (Intellectual Property) and the TRIPS 
Agreement.”152 
These provisions individually and collectively create a partial but incomplete 
safe haven for only some of the government action that is entirely lawful under 
TRIPS.  For example, TRIPS Article 31, referenced in TPP Art. 9.10.3(b)(i) and 
Art. 9.8.5, covers only a portion of legally issued compulsory licenses under 
TRIPS.  Specifically, the referenced TRIPS-compulsory licensing language does 
not directly reference the TRIPS/health solution.153  Likewise, the Investment 
Chapter language on compulsory licensing does not permit the possibility of 
judicially authorized compulsory licenses such as those granted in the U.S. in 
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.154 and its progeny and in India in F. Hoffman La-
Roche v. Cipla Ltd.155  Such judicial licenses are directly authorized by Article 44.2 
of the TRIPS Agreement.156  Moreover, as discussed previously, Art. 9.8.5 does 
                                                                                                                   
 150 Id. art. 9.10. 
 151 LUKES VANHONNAKER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AS FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
RIGHTS: FROM COLLISION TO COLLABORATIONS 150 (Edward Elgar Publ’g 2015). 
 152 Id.  Note, there are additional exceptions for non-conforming performance requirement 
measures detailed in Article 9.10.   
 153 See supra note 127. 
 154 547 U.S. 388, 393–97 (2006). 
 155 148 (2008) DLT 598 (N. Del. H.C.). 
 156 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 44.2:  
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not completely preclude challenges to other adverse IP-related decisions or 
policy changes. 
E.  THE LIMITATIONS ON PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS MIGHT INTERFERE 
WITH ENSURING REDUNDANT SOURCES OF MEDICINES AND LEGITIMATE 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 
Article 9.10.1(b), subject to certain exceptions, prohibits a Party from 
imposing requirements in order to achieve a given level or percentage of 
domestic content with respect to foreign investment rights.157  Many countries 
have used such “performance” provisions in the past as a development strategy 
to expand their economies via local content rules and related technology 
transfer and local working rules.  To similar effect, Article 9.10.1(h)(i) prohibits 
Parties from purchasing, using, or according preference to their own domestic 
technologies.158  Most developed countries, including the U.S., achieved 
industrial development in part by fostering rules requiring local content, by 
favoring local industries, and by procuring and purchasing domestically.  Now 
the U.S. is intent on kicking away the technology ladder and preventing 
countries from also developing industrial policy to grow their technological base 
and industrial capacity.159   
The TRIPS Agreement has vague and largely unenforced obligations to 
ensure technology transfer to developing countries,160 but some countries have 
taken matters into their own hands to try to preserve sovereign rights to 
promote technological advancement, particularly in important areas like 
pharmaceuticals.  For example, both India and Brazil have local 
production/local working rules in their compulsory licensing schemes that 
                                                                                                                   
Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Part and provided that the 
provisions of Part II specifically addressing use by governments, or by third 
parties authorized by a government, without the authorization of the right 
holder are complied with, Members may limit the remedies available against 
such use to payment of remuneration in accordance with subparagraph (h) of 
Article 31.  In other cases, the remedies under this Part shall apply or, where these remedies 
are inconsistent with a Member’s law, declaratory judgments and adequate compensation shall 
be available (emphasis added). 
 157 Investment Chapter, supra note 10. 
 158 Id. 
 159 See HA JOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER: DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (London, Anthem Press 2003); Brook K. Baker, Debunking IP-for-
Development: Africa Needs IP Space Not IP Shackles, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND 
AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT (Laurence Boulle, Emmanuel T. Laryea & Franziska Sucker eds., 2014).  
See Suerie Moon, Meaningful Technology Transfer to LDCs: A Proposal for a Monitoring Mechanism for 
TRIPS Article 66.2, ICTSD POLICY BRIEF NO. 9 (2011), http://ictsd.org/downloads/2011/05/te 
chnology-transfer-to-the-ldcs.pdf.  
 160 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 7, 66.2. 
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authorize the grant of compulsory licenses when local working, other than by 
importation, is not achieved.  The U.S. filed a WTO complaint against Brazil on 
this issue in 2001, but the complaint was voluntarily dismissed in accordance 
with a consultation compromise.161  Although Brazil has never used the 
impugned local-working provision, India has recently granted its first statutory 
compulsory license based in part on Bayer’s failure to produce any content 
locally.162 
Preserving sovereign rights to maintain or develop local pharmaceutical 
capacity is critical to assured access to medicines, not only to industrialization.  
When a rightholder has exclusive rights to a single source of supply, there are 
frequently monopoly-based affordability problems, but there are also high risks 
of interrupted supply if manufacturing, capacity, or quality assurance problems 
occur.163  Many countries choose to develop local pharmaceutical capacity 
precisely to ensure that they have locally managed sources of supply of essential 
life-saving medicines to supplement potentially fragile supplies available from 
limited number of producers on the global market.   
V.  THE ELI LILLY CASE:164 A PHARMACEUTICAL INVESTOR-STATE CLAIM 
GONE WILD165 
The hypothetical risks of investor-state claims in the pharmaceutical context 
have now materialized.  On November 7, 2012, Eli Lilly filed a Notice of Intent 
to Submit a Claim to Arbitration for CND$100 million166 against Canada due to 
                                                                                                                   
 161 See Brazil-Measures Affecting Patent Protection, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http:// 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds199_e.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2015).  
 162 Natco Pharma Ltd. v. Bayer Corp.—Compulsory License Application No. 1 of 2011 (Controller 
of Patents, Mumbai), Mar. 9, 2012, http://ipindia.nic.in/ipoNew/compulsory_License_1203201 
2.pdf.  Although on review the Intellectual Property Appellate Board slightly modified the local 
working standard adopted by the Comptroller of Patents, the local working rule still has vitality in 
India.  See IPAB decision ¶¶ 50–53, http://www.ipabindia.in/Pdfs/Order-45-2013.pdf. 
 163 The development of drug resistance due to poor antiretroviral adherence is a significant 
problem in areas where drug supply is often interrupted. See Nina Veenstra, Alan Whiteside, 
David Lalloo & Andrew Gibbs, Unplanned antiretroviral treatment interruptions in southern Africa: how 
should we be managing these?, 6 GLOBALIZATION & HEALTH 1–5 (2010), available at http://globalizati 
onandhealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1744-8603-6-4.  
 164 See supra note 6.  
 165 See Public Citizen, U.S. Pharmaceutical Corporation Uses NAFTA Foreign Investor Privileges Regime 
to Attack Canada’s Patent Policy, Demand $100 Million for Invalidation of a Patent (2013), https://www. 
citizen.org/eli-lilly-investor-state-factsheet.  
 166 Notice of Intent, supra note 64, ¶ 108.  Although Eli Lilly v. Canada is the first investor-state 
claim to be filed, there may be others in the works.  For example, Eli Lilly, in its complaint, indicated 
its probable intention to sue make and investor-state claim if its patent on Zyprexa, an anti-
schizophrenia drug, is invalidated.  Id. ¶ 48.  There are also rumors that Pfizer might be preparing an 
investor-state claim based on the invalidation of its patent on Viagra, a well-known erectile 
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the invalidation of its patent on pharmaceutical drug Strattera used to treat 
attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) (“the Strattera patent”).  The 
patent was invalidated by the Canadian Federal Court on September 14, 2010, 
and Eli Lilly’s appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal was unsuccessful.  In 
reaching its invalidation decision, the Federal Court of Appeal addressed three 
issues—did the trial judge err (1) by invalidating the patent for lack of 
demonstrated utility by misconstruing its promise, (2) by requiring too high a 
standard of utility, and (3) by deciding that Eli Lilly could not rely on the sound 
prediction of utility of the invention because the limited and short term study 
that it relied on was not disclosed in the patent application and because it did 
not provide an adequate factual foundation of the sound prediction/promise of 
the patent?167  The principle evidence weighed by the Federal Court of Appeal 
was the patent application itself and a twenty-one-person, three-week, double-
blind placebo cross-over study that showed a 30% greater reduction of ADHD 
in eleven of twenty-one patients.168  The Federal Court of Appeal ruled that this 
short-term study was erroneously not disclosed in the patent application.169  
Even if it had been disclosed, the study would have been insufficient to predict, 
as promised, that Strattera would be an effective long-term treatment of chronic 
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.170  In terms of the governing legal 
standard, the Federal Court of Appeal held that the utility of a patent is 
determined by the inventive promise made by the applicant either directly or by 
“sound prediction” and that such a promise or sound prediction must rest on 
disclosure made in the patent application itself.171   
Eli Lilly submitted a second Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to 
Arbitration to Canada on June 13, 2013,172 adding a claim relating to its patent 
                                                                                                                   
dysfunction medicine, for a failure to disclose the critical active pharmaceutical ingredient.  See Luke 
Eric Peterson, U.S. Pharma Corp Puts Canada on Notice of NAFTA Claim following Patent Invalidation at 
Hands of Canadian Court; More Such Claims in Wings?, INVESTMENT ARBITRATION REPORTER (Dec. 3, 
2012), http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20121203_2.  There has previously been NAFTA claims 
against the U.S. by Apotex, Inc. with respect to its inability to have a 180-day exclusivity period as a 
first generic entrant, where another generic company had been the first to challenge the underlying 
patent but had settled with the patent holder.  This case relates to intellectual property rights because 
it involves challenges thereto, but the technical rule on marketing exclusivity rights is contained in 
Food and Drug Administration statutes and regulations.  See Apotex, Inc. v. United States of 
America, Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1 (ICSID 2012), http://italaw.com/cases/1687.  
 167 Eli Lilly Co. v. Teva Canada Ltd., 2011 FAC 220. 
 168 Id. ¶¶ 10–14. 
 169 Id. ¶¶ 46–47. 
 170 Id. ¶ 40. 
 171 Id. ¶¶ 49, 51. 
 172 Eli Lilly and Co. v. Gov’t of Canada, Case No. UNCT/14/2, Notice of Intent to Submit a 
Claim to Arbitration under NAFTA Chapter Eleven (Strattera and Zyprexa) (ICSID 2013), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1530.pdf. 
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on the antipsychotic drug Zyprexa, which is used to treat schizophrenia and 
related psychotic disorders (“the Zyprexa patent”). The Zyprexa patent was 
invalidated by the Canadian Federal Court on November 10, 2011 for its failure 
of sound prediction, and Eli Lilly’s appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal was 
again unsuccessful.  Eli Lilly’s investor-state claim against Canada now concerns 
the invalidation of both the Strattera and the Zyprexa patents.  
On September 12, 2013, Eli Lilly submitted its Notice of Arbitration,173 
setting out in detail its grievances against Canada, all of which fundamentally 
relate to Canada’s application of its “promise” doctrine to invalidate Eli Lilly’s 
previously granted patents.  Eli Lilly pursues claims with respect to violations of 
minimum standards of treatment and expropriation making the following 
allegations against Canada:  
(a) Failure to meet its obligation under NAFTA Article 
1709(1) to grant patents for inventions in all fields of 
technology that “are new, result from an inventive step 
and are capable of industrial application”;174 
(b) Failure to meet its obligation under NAFTA Article 
1709(7) to ensure that patent rights are enjoyable 
“without discrimination as to field of technology”;175  
(c) Failure to meet its obligation under NAFTA Article 
1701(1) to provide “adequate and effective protection 
and enforcement of intellectual property rights”;176 
(d) Direct and indirect expropriation of Eli Lilly’s intellectual 
property in the form of the patent rights conferred by the 
Strattera and Zyprexa patents, in violation of NAFTA 
Article 1110;177 and  
(e) Violation of the minimum standard of treatment 
accorded to investors under NAFTA Article 1105.178  
On September 29, 2014 Eli Lilly submitted a Claimant’s Memorial 
containing further details of its grievances against the Canadian government.  
Several paragraphs of the Memorial are devoted to an explanation of the “low 
threshold” set by the traditional utility requirement, from which Canada’s 
                                                                                                                   
 173 Eli Lilly and Co. v. Gov’t of Canada, Case No. UNCT/14/2, Notice of Arbitration (ICSID 
2013), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1582.pdf. 
 174 Id. ¶ 5. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. ¶¶ 74–79. 
 178 Id. ¶¶ 80–84. 
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“promise” doctrine represents a ‘dramatic,’ ‘arbitrary,’ and ‘unpredictable’ 
departure.179 Utility, Eli Lilly claims, is “binary” and does not require an 
assessment of the degree of comparative utility.180  It simply requires that an 
invention be “capable or susceptible of being put to a specific industrial use.”181  
Furthermore, Lilly claims that Canada’s utility requirement “bears no 
resemblance to the longstanding patent utility standards of its NAFTA partners, 
the United States and Mexico.”182  
The ‘wrongful’ nature of Canada’s judicial decisions can be demonstrated, 
Lilly claims, by the fact that Zyprexa and Strattera have been successfully 
patented in eighty-one and thirty-six jurisdictions, respectively.183  Canada is the 
“only jurisdiction in the world” that has invalidated these patents on the basis 
of inutility.184  What Lilly fails to mention is that its Strattera patent was 
invalidated by the U.S. District Court of New Jersey one month prior to its 
invalidation by the Canadian Federal Court on the same grounds of inutility.185  
Contrary to Eli Lilly’ claim, the so-called “promise” doctrine is “a legal 
concept with deep historical roots and global reach.”186  The notion that patents 
contain promises of specific utility is found in many jurisdictions around the 
world (albeit under different labels and guises) and is essentially a method of 
purposive construction of patent claims.187  The ‘promise’ made by a patent is 
the representation that the patented invention will achieve or avoid specific 
outcomes, for example, the treatment of a specific disease in a certain manner.  
The Canadian doctrine essentially requires the court to construe the patent’s 
explicit or implicit promise(s) within the context of the patent as a whole 
through the eyes of a skilled reader, in relation to the science and information 
available at the time of filing.188  Utility must be demonstrable at the date of 
filing; since it can only be predicted at this time, there must be a factual basis 
and line of reasoning that supports the soundness of this prediction.189  
                                                                                                                   
 179 Eli Lilly and Co. v. Gov’t of Canada, Case No. UNCT/14/2, Claimant’s Memorial 
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 189 Counter Memorial, supra note 185, ¶ 126.  
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In its Claimant’s Memorial, Eli Lilly alleges that Canada has violated the 
following three obligations under NAFTA: 
1.  Chapter 17, which requires Canada to provide patents to 
inventions in all fields of technology without 
discrimination on the following grounds190:  
a. Both patents were invalidated despite meeting the 
criterion of “capable of industrial application” in 
Article 1709(1); 
b. The promise doctrine discriminates against 
pharmaceutical inventions, contrary to Article 
1709(7);  
c. The patents were invalidated on a legal ground that 
did not exist at the time the patents were initially 
granted, contrary to Article 1709(8);  
d. The invalidation of the patents represents a failure 
by Canada to provide adequate and effective 
protection and enforcement of intellectual property 
rights, contrary to Article 1701(1).  
2.  Article 1105, which requires Canada to afford ‘fair and 
equitable treatment’ to Lilly’s investments by failing to 
provide191:  
a. Protection against arbitrary treatment;  
b. Protection of legitimate, investment-backed 
expectations; 
c. Protection against discriminatory treatment.  
3.  Article 1110, which prohibits the direct or indirect 
expropriation of foreign investments except under certain 
conditions, none of which apply here192:  
a. The patents were not invalidated for a “public 
purpose”; 
b. The promise doctrine was not applied on a “non-
discriminatory basis”; 
c. The expropriation did not occur in accordance with 
the minimum standard of treatment required by 
Article 1105(1). 
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These arguments (and Canada’s response) will be explored further below.  
A.  ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF CHAPTER 17  
First, Eli Lilly claims that the phrase “capable of industrial application” 
within Article 1709(1) is “well understood in the patent context” and merely 
requires that “an invention have the capacity to be put to a specific use in 
industry.”193  Accordingly, Eli Lilly argues, “a good faith interpretation of 
‘capable of industrial application’ and ‘useful’ in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning of those terms leads to a straightforward conclusion: an invention with 
the capacity to be put to specific use in industry meets the standard articulated 
in NAFTA Article 1709(1).”194 Eli Lilly claims that this interpretation is 
supported by the subsequent practice of the NAFTA parties,195 the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (PCT),196 and the TRIPS negotiations.197  
In its Counter Memorial, Canada assembles eight experts and witnesses to 
support its defense against Eli Lilly.  Each expert or witness statement 
invariably chastises Eli Lilly for its misstatements of U.S. and Mexican law, its 
misleading narrative of the ‘harmonization’ of international patent law and its 
history of speculative patent filing.198  Canada describes Eli Lilly’s summary of 
the U.S. utility standard as “simplistic, inaccurate, and [ignorant of] the 
complexities of the standard,”199 particularly given that “U.S. law reaches many 
of the same results as do Canada’s utility rules.”200  Moreover, “like Canadian 
law, United States law has evolved since NAFTA came into force, undermining 
any suggestion by [Lilly] that the Parties enshrined a particular standard in 
NAFTA.”201  Canada equally criticizes Eli Lilly’s description of Mexican patent 
law as “flawed, self-serving and inaccurate,”202 failing to acknowledge its distinct 
interpretation of “industrial applicability” and its substantial patent reform post-
NAFTA.203 Canada then provides a comprehensive history of WIPO, WTO 
and TRIPS negotiations to demonstrate that the “utility requirement continues 
to evade international consensus.”204  Finally, Canada argues that the PCT “is 
                                                                                                                   
 193 Id. ¶ 189.  
 194 Id. ¶ 192.  
 195 Id. ¶ 196.  
 196 Id. ¶ 203.  
 197 Id. ¶¶ 205–206.  
 198 Counter Memorial, supra note 185, ¶ 20.  
 199 Id. ¶ 171.  
 200 Id. ¶ 11.  
 201 Id. ¶ 173.  
 202 Id. ¶ 176.  
 203 Id. ¶ 12.  
 204 Id. ¶ 196.  
42
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol23/iss1/2
2015] CORPORATE POWER UNBOUND  43 
 
irrelevant, as it does not deal with substantive patent law issues at all.”205  It 
merely covers the basic requirements of “form and content” that must be met 
in order for PCT applications to be accepted and processed by national 
authorities.206  Moreover, filing in accordance with the PCT is no guarantee that 
a patent application will produce a successful patent that will survive judicial 
review.207  
Eli Lilly argues that NAFTA Chapter 17 “explicitly contemplates that a 
Party ‘may implement in its domestic law more extensive protection of 
intellectual property rights than is required’ under Chapter 17,”208 but that 
Canada has “acted inconsistently with its obligations under Chapter 17” by 
providing less protection by means of creating an additional hurdle to 
patentability.209  By invalidating patents despite “ample evidence” that the 
patented drugs had the capacity to be put to a specific industrial use,210 Canada 
has “substantially redefined utility as contemplated by NAFTA,” setting a 
dangerous precedent for the unilateral reinterpretation of ‘internationally-
accepted’ meanings.211  
Eli Lilly’s second argument under Chapter 17 is that the promise doctrine 
represents de facto discrimination against the pharmaceutical sector, contrary to 
Article 1709(7).  Although Canada’s promise doctrine applies prima facie to all 
technical fields, Eli Lilly argues that, in practice, it has exclusively affected the 
pharmaceutical sector.212  Eli Lilly claims that since 2005, inutility findings 
jumped from 0% to 40% for pharmaceutical patents, while inutility findings for 
non-pharmaceutical patents declined within the same period.213  Eli Lilly even 
goes so far as to assert discrimination based on nationality, claiming that the 
impugned patents in all twenty-three inutility decisions were initially granted to 
pharmaceutical companies headquartered outside of Canada.214  Canada rejects 
these allegations as “based upon a selective and misleading analysis of patent 
litigation outcomes.”215  Canada asserts that “[o]ut of hundreds of patent 
challenges in the 2005–2014 period, only three pharmaceutical patents have 
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been invalidated on the sole basis of lack of ‘utility,’ two of which are [Lilly’s 
patents] which are the subject of this arbitration.”216   
Thirdly, Eli Lilly claims that Article 1709(8) protects its patents from 
invalidation based on legal grounds (i.e., the promise doctrine) that did not exist 
at the time the patents were initially granted.217  Canada rejects this argument, 
asserting that the promise doctrine is based on longstanding principles of 
Canadian patent law that existed prior to the initial grant of Eli Lilly’s patents.218  
Furthermore, it has been a requirement of Canadian law since the 1970s that 
patent applications disclose a sound prediction of utility where utility cannot be 
demonstrated at the filing date.219  Where a patentee relies upon a sound 
prediction of utility, the patentee must disclose the factual basis and line of 
reasoning that supports that prediction in order to distinguish a useful promise 
from a mere idea.220  
Finally, Eli Lilly argues that Canada’s invalidation of its patents constitutes a 
failure to provide adequate and effective protection of its intellectual property 
rights in violation of Article 1701(1).221  In this regard, Eli Lilly mistakenly 
equates the protection of IPRs guaranteed by NAFTA with the imposition of 
specific, self-serving interpretations of substantive patent law on NAFTA 
parties.  Contrary to this view, Canada claims that it provides full protection of 
IPRs through its domestic legal system, supported by full and fair judicial 
enforcement.222 
B.  ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 1105  
Eli Lilly also claims that the invalidation of its patents violates “at least three 
well-established aspects of the Minimum Standard of Treatment,” including 
protection against arbitrary treatment, protection of legitimate, investment-
backed expectations, and protection against discriminatory treatment.223  Eli 
Lilly alleges that the promise doctrine is arbitrary because it is “completely 
unpredictable and unreasonably difficult to satisfy.”224  It claims that inventors 
“have no way of knowing what ‘promises’ a Canadian court might subjectively 
find in the patent application” and patentees “have no way of knowing how 
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much evidence the court will require to satisfy those promises.”225 According to 
Eli Lilly, “even successful, published, and statistically significant clinical trial 
results fail to satisfy the judges’ standards of design, size, or duration.”226  
Moreover, Eli Lilly claims that “Federal Courts often seek to construe the 
promise of the patent not from the patent claims that legally define the scope of 
invention, but from statements in the disclosure never intended to relate to 
utility.”227  This construction of promised utility, combined with the imposition 
of “heightened evidentiary burdens” and an additional disclosure rule for sound 
prediction of utility, combine to render the promise doctrine, in Eli Lilly’s eyes, 
entirely arbitrary.228  Eli Lilly adds, as a final insult, that the promise doctrine 
“leads to illogical and absurd results.”229 
In its defense, Canada argues that the construction of a patent’s promise is 
neither “subjective” nor “arbitrary” but rather “a fair interpretation of the 
patent in accordance with the long established “purposive” and “informed” 
approach to patent construction.230  This requires, first, construing the patent as 
a whole, “having regard to both the claims and the description in the patent 
specification; secondly, reading the patent from the perspective of a skilled 
reader . . . equipped with common general knowledge in the relevant field”; and 
finally, reading expert evidence on how a skilled reader would have understood 
the patent.”231  After applying these settled rules of interpretation, “if the court 
determines that a skilled reader would have understood the patent to contain a 
[specific] promise, then that is the promise to which the patent will be held.”232  
Accordingly, patents are interpreted, not “subjectively,” but rather according to 
the application of “ordinary and settled rules of construction.”233  
Furthermore, patents are not subject to a “heightened evidentiary” burden; 
rather, they “benefit from a presumption of validity,” and if that validity is 
subsequently challenged, “the ordinary balance of probabilities test applies.”234  
Judges do not arbitrarily concoct how much scientific evidence is required to 
show that a prediction of utility is sound; they assess, based on the evidence put 
forward by the parties, whether the skilled reader would have viewed the 
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prediction as sound.235  This is not ‘arbitrariness’—this is, Canada claims, the 
essence of the adjudicative process.236  
Eli Lilly’s expectations that Canadian law would remain frozen in time from 
the date its patents were first granted were allegedly “reasonable” because it 
“could not reasonably have expected that Canada would promulgate such a 
unique and arbitrary doctrine—particularly one that violates Canada’s 
international obligations.”237  When Eli Lilly initially patented Zyprexa and 
Strattera, it “legitimately expected that Canada’s patent utility requirement 
would not be changed in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner.”238  There is no 
way it could have foreseen the erection of “new and unanticipated hurdles to 
patentability,”239 which had “no basis in Canada’s statutory patent law.”240   
Canada rejects these arguments, asserting that “evolution in the law is an 
inevitable feature of any legal system” and nothing in NAFTA prohibits the 
domestic law of Parties from evolving over time.241  Moreover, Eli Lilly’s 
patents were invalidated on the basis of “longstanding, rational, and fair rules of 
Canadian patent law that have not changed since [Lilly] filed its patents.”242  To 
support its argument, Canada refers to the leading Canadian case on the law of 
utility—Consolboard v MacMillan Bloedel (Sask.) Ltd. (1981)—and Justice 
Dickson’s remarks that a patent is “not useful” if it “will not do what the 
specification promises that it will do.”243  Canada argues that the promise 
doctrine was recognized as “an integral part of Canadian law by the Supreme 
Court of Canada long before [Lilly] filed its patent applications.”244 
Eli Lilly further claims that its legitimate expectations were rooted in 
Canada’s international commitments under NAFTA and the PCT.245  The 
promise doctrine’s “dramatic and internationally wrongful departure” from 
such international commitments was “outside the ‘acceptable margin of change’ 
that investors must reasonably anticipate.”246  Eli Lilly also claims that its 
legitimate expectations stemmed from the initial grant of the Zyprexa and 
Strattera patents.247  These patents, Eli Lilly explains, were “more than a mere 
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representation to Lilly from the government of Canada; they were a bundle of 
legally enforceable rights.”248  In response, Canada reminds Eli Lilly that  
every inventor seeking a patent in Canada is well aware (because 
the Patent Act makes this clear) that the decision of the Patent 
Office to grant a patent is always subject to review by the Federal 
Court for actual compliance with the Patent Act.  No reasonable 
patentee expects the grant of a patent . . . to be unassailable.249 
Furthermore, Eli Lilly could not “reasonably expect Canadian courts to ignore 
longstanding principles and rules of Canadian law, whether or not [Lilly] itself 
was properly advised in this regard.”250  Eli Lilly could not have legitimately 
expected that “latently defective patents would be enforced when 
challenged.”251 
Canada highlights three fatal flaws in Eli Lilly’s argument that its legitimate 
expectations require protection under Article 1105.  First, Eli Lilly failed to 
show that the theory of legitimate expectations is a rule of customary 
international law protected by Article 1105(1).252  Secondly, the doctrine of 
legitimate expectations cannot be applied to judgments of domestic courts 
interpreting domestic law.253  Thirdly, Eli Lilly could not have reasonably held 
the expectations it claims; Canada’s rules on utility are long-standing and the 
grant of a patent is always subject to reassessment by the courts for compliance 
with Canadian law.254  To accept Eli Lilly’s arguments here would be to offer 
every disappointed litigant an international remedy for any domestic ruling it 
had expected to win.255 
Furthermore, notwithstanding Eli Lilly’s earnest claims to the contrary, 
“nothing in the record even remotely resembles the type of egregious behaviour 
which past NAFTA tribunals have said must be evident in order to breach 
Article 1105(1).”256  NAFTA jurisprudence clearly shows that “a violation of 
Article 1105(1) will not be found unless there is evidence of serious 
malfeasance, manifestly arbitrary behaviour or denial of justice by the 
respondent NAFTA Party.”257  Eli Lilly did not suffer from “lack of due 
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process, procedural irregularities, political interference, lack of impartiality, 
pretence of form or bad faith or anything else which could offend judicial 
propriety.”258 
The only basis upon which an international tribunal could impugn the 
judgment of a domestic court interpreting domestic law as a violation of 
international law would be a denial of justice—which is not the case here.259  Eli 
Lilly was afforded “full opportunity to plead its case” and the Court reached 
rational decisions based on extensive factual and expert evidence and “issued 
reasoned judgments relying on long-standing precedent and principles of 
Canadian patent law.”260  In total, nine different Canadian judges were involved 
in the Strattera and Zyprexa patent cases before the final invalidation decisions 
were reached.261  The cases were decided “reasonably and in good faith on the 
basis of evidence adduced by the Parties in an open adversarial proceeding,” in 
stark contrast to the private, unappealable tribunal decision which Lilly now 
seeks.262   
Canada claims that the doctrine of “legitimate expectations” is 
“fundamentally [inapplicable to] judgments of the domestic judiciary acting in 
an adjudicative function of domestic statutory interpretation.”263  Eli Lilly “has 
not identified a single instance of an international tribunal finding a violation of 
an investor’s ‘legitimate expectations’ based solely on the outcome of a 
domestic court’s interpretation or application of domestic law.”264  
Henning Gross Ruse-Khan agrees that Eli Lilly’s purported expansion of 
the theory of legitimate expectations is unreasonable and unsustainable in this 
context.  Ruse-Khan argues that intellectual property rights such as patents 
cannot provide the right holder with “a legitimate expectation that measures 
interfering with the use of these rights in the host state will not occur.”265  A 
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patent is a domestic statutory creation, granted upon the fulfillment of certain 
conditions.  If one of those conditions is not met, the grant can be revoked as 
easily as it was given.  Ruse-Khan summarizes his position as follows: 
In all cases, the grant of the patent certainly does not and cannot 
create any legitimate expectation that the exclusivity it confers is 
absolute and will remain without interference from accepted 
checks and balances inherent in the IP system.  Instead, the 
expectations of the patent holding investor are a priori limited by 
the regulatory tools the domestic IP law of the host state 
foresees.  Even in case a host state newly introduces such tools, 
or changes its policy of using existing ones after the investor has 
obtained his patent, the general acceptance and widespread state 
practice vis-à-vis these measures would strongly side against 
findings of interference with legitimate expectations.  In Eli Lilly 
vs. Canada, the investor hence cannot legitimately expect from the 
grant of patents by the Canadian Patent Office (CPO) that those 
remain free from any validity challenges in the courts.  Also a 
change in how the Canadian courts apply patentability standards 
such as utility or the disclosure obligation as such does not affect 
legitimate investor expectations: No expectation for a stable and 
predictable business environment can go so far that the 
circumstances prevailing at the time the investment is made must 
remain unchanged.  Any resort to familiar and commonly used 
mechanisms to limit IP exclusivity . . . should never be considered 
as a breach of [fair and equitable treatment standards].266 
Furthermore, Ruse-Khan argues that the negative, rather than positive, 
character of IP rights—which allow the right holder to prevent others from 
utilizing the protected subject matter but do not confer a positive right to 
exploit that matter—naturally permits national governments to impose further 
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limitations on the use of the protected subject matter, in the form of regulatory 
controls.267  As Ruse-Khan concludes:  
[T]he negative right to exclude others from exploiting IP-
protected subject matter does not entail a guarantee against state 
intervention which imposes conditions upon the production or 
limits the use and sale of the patented product.  For example, the 
introduction of price controls for a certain patented medication 
does not interfere with the patent for that medicine.  Since such a 
measure is outside the protection IP rights confer, these rights 
cannot create legitimate expectations as to the (continued) 
absence of such measures.268 
In relation to Eli Lilly’s allegation of discriminatory treatment, Canada dusts 
off this argument with three swift strokes.  First, Article 1105 “protects against 
unjustifiable discriminatory treatment in court proceedings founded on the 
investor’s foreign nationality, not mere differential treatment. In order to 
challenge the judgment of a domestic court, [Lilly] would have to demonstrate 
that ‘it was the victim of discrimination on account of its nationality.’ ”269  
Secondly, all patent applicants, Canadian and foreign alike, across all industries, 
are held to the same standard of promised utility.  Even if it were true that more 
pharmaceutical patents have been invalidated than in other industries, this is 
“symptomatic of the litigiousness of the pharmaceutical industry, not the 
discriminatory effect of Canadian law.”270  Finally, contrary to the misleading 
statistics peddled by Eli Lilly, there have only been three patent invalidations 
based solely on inutility, two of which were the Strattera and Zyprexa patents 
disputed here.271  
C.  ALLEGED EXPROPRIATION OF ELI LILLY’S INVESTMENTS   
To argue that the invalidation of its patents constitutes both direct and 
indirect expropriation under Article 1110, Eli Lilly relies upon what it calls the 
classic definition of direct expropriation as the “open, deliberate, and 
acknowledged takings of property.”272  It argues that regardless of whether the 
expropriation is deemed to be direct or indirect, it must be compensable, as it 
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does not fall within the exception provided by Article 1110(7).273  Consequently, 
the expropriation violates NAFTA Chapter 17,274 and arbitrarily conflicts with 
Eli Lilly’s reasonable investment-backed expectations.275  
Eli Lilly then outlines why Canada’s expropriation of its investments does 
not fall within any permissible exceptions: (a) the expropriation was 
discriminatory as it treated pharmaceutical patents less favorably than patents in 
other fields of technology;276 (b) the expropriation lacked a public purpose 
because it “serves no rational policy”;277 and (c) the expropriation was not 
carried out in accordance with Article 1105(1) because it did not accord fair and 
equitable treatment and full protection and security to Eli Lilly’s investments.278  
Far from serving no rational policy, Canada’s promise doctrine is designed 
“to ensure that patentees provide the consideration they promised in exchange 
for the grant of a 20-year monopoly . . . to ensure that patents are filed on the 
basis of true invention, rather than of speculation.”279  Moreover, Eli Lilly’s 
tendency to file numerous patent applications with little or no basis for the 
alleged new uses suggests a desire to monopolize areas of research and 
innovation, thereby demonstrating the importance of rigorous Canadian patent 
laws.280  Between 1992 and 2004, Lilly filed patent applications claiming twelve 
alleged new uses of atomoxetine (Strattera) in the treatment of psoriasis, 
stuttering, incontinence, hot flashes, anxiety, learning disabilities, cognitive 
failure, conduct disorder, tic disorders, oppositional defiant disorder, pervasive 
development disorder and ADHD, with only half of these applications actually 
referring to experimental data.281  Similarly excessive patent applications were 
filed (and later abandoned) for olanzapine (Zyprexa).282  Eli Lilly’s history of 
speculative patenting effectively created a “thicket” of low-quality patent 
applications, which were later abandoned—precisely the kind of behavior which 
Canadian patent law is designed to prevent.283  
Eli Lilly claims that the invalidation of its patents has “deprived [its] 
investments of substantially all value.”284  The loss of patent protection for 
Zyprexa and Strattera allegedly allowed Lilly’s competitors to enter the market 
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 278 Id. ¶ 251.  
 279 Counter Memorial, supra note 185, ¶ 7.  
 280 Id. ¶ 9.  
 281 Id. ¶¶ 153–154.  
 282 Id. ¶ 155.  
 283 Id. ¶ 164.  
 284 Claimant’s Memorial, supra note 179, ¶ 14.  
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and sell copies of the drugs, and Eli Lilly could no longer enforce its patent 
rights against infringers.285  On the contrary, Canada claims, the assessment of 
whether a substantial deprivation has occurred requires a consideration of the 
investor’s enterprise as a whole.286  Strattera and Zyprexa form  
just one part of [Lilly’s] overall enterprise in Canada, which 
continues to grow and enjoys substantial profits in numerous 
lines of business. Nor did the measures prevent [Lilly] from 
continuing to produce and sell its atomoxetine and olanzapine 
based products.  It still holds a valid [Notice of Compliance] 
permitting it to sell these products . . . at considerable profit.287 
One might reasonably note that Eli Lilly in fact collected years of unwarranted 
supra-competitive prices on the basis of patent claims later found to be invalid.  
One might also reasonably note that both patents were nearing the end of their 
patent terms when invalidated. 
Eli Lilly claims that its argument is supported by past precedent, where 
“tribunals have concluded that judicial measures qualify as indirect 
expropriations when they result in a substantial deprivation and violate a rule of 
international law.”288  In this case, Eli Lilly claims that the revocation of its 
patents violated international law by failing to provide the adequate and 
effective protection of IPRs demanded by NAFTA Chapter 17.289  
Canada sweeps away Eli Lilly’s claims with three clean brushstrokes.  First, 
there cannot be an ‘expropriation’ of property when no property rights exist at 
all.  There is no inherent right to a patent at common law; it is an entirely 
statutory creation and as it lives by the pen, so it dies.  “When a domestic court 
has determined through the good faith application of domestic law that a 
property right is invalid . . . there is no ‘taking’ of a property right which did not 
properly exist in the first place.”290  The judicial invalidation of a patent cannot 
constitute expropriation as there is no transfer of property but simply a 
recognition that no property exists.291  Accordingly, Eli Lilly’s patents were not 
property interests capable of expropriation under Article 1110(1) because they 
were not valid property interests at all.292  
                                                                                                                   
 285 Id. ¶ 21.  
 286 Counter Memorial, supra note 185, ¶ 410.  
 287 Id. ¶ 411.  
 288 Claimant’s Memorial, supra note 179, ¶ 180.  
 289 Id. ¶ 185. 
 290 Counter Memorial, supra note 185, ¶ 17.  
 291 Id. ¶ 19.  
 292 Id. ¶ 303.  
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Secondly, Canada is protected by Article 1110(7) which provides that a 
revocation of an IPR cannot engage Article 1110(1) if it is consistent with 
NAFTA Chapter 17.293  Canada argues that it is plainly compliant with Chapter 
17.294  Canada’s Patent Act provides that a patent may be available for any 
invention that is “useful,”295 and the criterion of utility is applied without 
distinction as to field of technology.296  Moreover, the absence of any fixed 
international meaning of the term “utility” or the phrase “capable of industrial 
application” is evident from the text of NAFTA itself and “confirmed by the 
divergent practice of the Parties post NAFTA.”297  Thirdly, Eli Lilly’s 
expropriation claim fails to meet the three-step test for expropriation under 
customary international law because an invalid patent is not a property interest 
capable of expropriation.298  In light of these arguments, Canada refutes Eli 
Lilly’s allegations that its bona fide judicial determination of rights at domestic 
law constituted direct or indirect expropriation.299 
Eli Lilly makes an expropriation claim despite a provision in NAFTA that is 
essentially identical to the TPPA Investment Chapter clause supposedly creating 
a safe haven for compulsory licenses and for patenting decisions.  The relevant 
NAFTA provision, Article 1110(7), reads as follows: “This Article 
[Expropriation and Compensation] does not apply to the issuance of 
compulsory licenses granted in relation to intellectual property rights, or to the 
revocation, limitation or creation of intellectual property rights, to the extent 
that such issuance, revocation, limitation or creation is consistent with Chapter 
Seventeen (Intellectual Property).”300  The arguments raised by Eli Lilly in this 
dispute demonstrate the potential ineffectiveness of such clauses that ostensibly 
shelter FTA-compliant patent revocations from expropriation claims. 
From a policy perspective, allowing Eli Lilly to succeed on such far-fetched 
arguments would turn investor-state arbitration tribunals into supranational 
courts of appeal.  As Canada adeptly warns,   
If a domestic court’s adjudication of property rights can be 
transformed into an expropriation by alleged inconsistency with 
any of these other international law obligations, then NAFTA 
                                                                                                                   
 293 Id. ¶ 305. 
 294 Id.  
 295 Id. ¶ 350.  
 296 Id. ¶ 384.  
 297 Id. ¶¶ 305, 364.  
 298 Id. ¶ 310.  
 299 Id. ¶ 306.  
 300 North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 110(7), Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 
289 (1993); cf. Investment Chapter, supra note 10, art. 9.8.5. 
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Chapter Eleven tribunals will be transformed both into tribunals 
with plenary jurisdiction over all international treaties and 
supranational courts of appeal in domestic property law issues.301  
Canada concludes by criticizing Lilly’s attempts  
to substitute Canadian patent policy and requirements for an 
alternative, detailed set of rules of its own making.  [Lilly’s] rules 
would promote the granting of patent monopolies on the basis of 
speculation, in a manner dissuading innovation, and with the 
public receiving only misleading and incomplete disclosure in 
return.  These are not the rules set out by Canada’s legislature in 
the Patent Act.302 
Eli Lilly v. Canada sets a dangerous precedent for pharmaceutical 
corporations to attack foreign governments for differences between foreign 
standards of patentability and the standards enjoyed by pharmaceutical 
corporations in their home countries.  As Eli Lilly was seeking additional 
patents on already-patented compounds, it needed to prove the superiority of 
its own drugs over other members of the patented class.  In this regard, 
Canadian law is designed to prevent experimental over-patenting that would 
pre-emptively fence off areas of research on the basis of speculation.303  Canada 
is entitled to design domestic patentability standards to prevent abuses of the 
patent system.  However Eli Lilly is seeking to elevate its own competing views 
of how Canadian patent law ought to apply, into legally-enforceable 
expectations.304  Such an unprecedented incursion on national sovereignty will 
continue to occur as long as investor-state dispute settlement provisions are 
included within international treaties.  While Canada possesses the financial 
capacity to defend itself against such attacks, developing countries may not.  
VI.  CONCLUSION: STRIKE THE INVESTMENT CHAPTER OR OTHERWISE LIMIT 
ITS APPLICATION TO IPRS 
Under the logic of Eli Lilly’s investor-state claim, foreign investors’ IP-based 
expectations have now become unbound.  Even the doctrine of legitimate 
expectations, which is itself a huge stretch of operative minimum standards of 
treatment principles, is no longer tethered to operative due process (minimum 
                                                                                                                   
 301 Counter Memorial, supra note 185, ¶ 334.  
 302 Id. ¶ 419.  
 303 Id. ¶ 7.  
 304 Id. ¶ 2.  
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standards of treatment) or to promises of regulatory coherence (indirect 
expropriation) or to equal treatment compared to domestic firms (national 
treatment).  Instead Eli Lilly hitches its investment expectations to the best deal 
on IP achieved anywhere else in a cross-referenced investment agreement.  
Moreover, it suggests that its expectations can go in only one direction—
upward.  Any reversal, modification, or rebalancing305 of existing IP protections 
would dilute the gleam in its eye—unlimited profits on the horizon—and justify 
a full compensatory damage assessment in its favor. 
The practical implications of this radical assertion of investor privilege is 
two-fold.  First, foreign IP investors, mainly from rich countries, could now 
directly sue virtually any government, rich or poor, to enforce any and all 
directly or indirectly incorporated IP-related treaties or the highest standard of 
comparable national IP law found anywhere in the world.  These investor 
prerogatives sit on top of state-to-state dispute resolution mechanisms under 
TRIPS and other trade agreements.  They sit on top of more stringent border 
and criminal enforcement measures that consume state resources.  They sit on 
top of state-state investment clause dispute resolution.  Finally they sit on top of 
new deterrent civil remedies, mandatory injunction rights and draconian 
damages.  In other words, IP rightholders’ enforcement options are now 
unbound. 
Secondly, a tribunal of three private international trade lawyers will now sit 
as an ad hoc subcommittee with power to review and veto every sovereign 
decision affecting the intellectual property rights of Big Pharma.  Rejecting an 
IP-related trade pact, such as, the U.S.-SACU FTA,306 refusing to join an IP 
enforcement treaty such as the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement,307 
tightening up patentability standards through legislative, administrative, or 
                                                                                                                   
 305 Dreyfuss & Frankel, supra note 265, at 3 (“[I]nvestment rationales are largely impervious to 
flexibility and balancing.”); Okediji, supra note 265, at 1122–23.   
Lilly’s arguments amount to a claim that, in agreeing to an in- vestment treaty, a 
government takes on an affirmative obligation to constrain the evolution of 
national legal standards, or to limit the public policy that fuels such evolution to 
the equilibrium that existed at the time the treaty was signed.  Such a backwards-
looking approach suggests a rigidity not contemplated in the international 
intellectual property framework and that, uncurbed, would undermine the 
capacity of intellectual property law and policy to respond to dynamic shifts in 
the national or global technological frontier. 
 306 See Drusilla K. Brown, Kozo Kiyota & Robert M. Stern, An Analysis of the U.S.-SACU FTA 
Negotiations (IPC Working Paper Series No. 17, 2006), available at http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/ 
handle/2007.42/41235.  
 307 The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) was rejected by the European 
Parliament on 4 July 2012.  See European Parliament rejects ACTA, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
(Apr. 7, 2012), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/201207 
03IPR48247/html/European-Parliament-rejects-ACTA. 
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judicial action,308 instituting new opposition procedures,309 rejecting patent term 
extensions,310 granting compulsory licenses,311 denying data exclusivity or 
patent-registration linkage312 or shortening data and marketing exclusivity on 
biologics,313 creating a new bio-similars pathway,314 requiring disclosure of 
clinical trial data,315 or allowing parallel importation of medicines as the U.S. 
Supreme Court did with textbooks316—all of the aforementioned could 
potentially result in an investor suit and an unappealable arbitral decision.  In 
other words, foreign IP rightholders’ ability to oversee and set national IP 
policy is also now unbound.  Although this Article focuses on IP-related 
investment claims, it is worth noting that pharmaceutical-related investor-state 
dispute settlement claims could also be brought with respect to drug regulatory 
decisions affecting marketing approvals,317 required warnings, inspections, and 
with respect to adverse decisions or due process defects affecting the listing of a 
medicine for reimbursement.318 
                                                                                                                   
 308 Moeller IP Advisors, Non-patentable subject matter according to the New Guidelines of the Argentine 
PTO, http://www.moellerip.com/non-patentable-subjectmatter-according-to-the-new-guidelines-
of-the-argentine-PTO.  Ho argues that investment claims might be brought against patent 
standards designed to prevent evergreening as in India.   
 309 The 2011 America Invents Act radically revises the U.S. system of post-grant patent review 
by providing four new post-grant opposition proceedings in addition to existing ex parte 
reexamination.  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 312–313 (2015). 
 310 India is reported to have rejected patent term extensions in its free trade agreement 
negotiations with the European Union.  See James Love, Negotiating Text, EU/India FTA, 
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INTERNATIONAL (Mar. 28, 2013), http://keionline.org/node/1691.  
 311 India, Brazil, Thailand, Indonesia, Ecuador, and many others countries have granted 
compulsory licenses on medicines, including several European countries.  See Reed Beall & 
Randall Kyhn, Trends in Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Since the Doha Declaration: A Database 
Analysis, 9 PLOS MEDICINE e1001154 (2012), available at http://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/a 
rticle?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1001154.  For a statement of concern about the possible 
invalidation of compulsory licenses in India through use of investment challenges, see Prabhas 
Ranjan, Medical Patents and Expropriation in International Investment Law – with Special Reference to India, 
5 MANCHESTER J. INT’L ECON. L. 72 (2008); for a critical view of investment claims relating to 
compulsory licenses, see Gibson, supra note 128; Ho, supra note 265, at 64–67; for a favorable 
view, see Rutledge, supra note 128. 
 312 Ho, supra note 265, at 67–71. 
 313 See Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7).  
 314 At the end of March 2010, the United States enacted the Biologics Price Competition and 
Innovation Act (BPCI), the long-awaited U.S. pathway to biosimilars, though operation of this 
pathway is still dependent on regulatory action by the FDA.  42 U.S.C. § 262(k).  Europe has had 
an established pathway for biosimilars since 2005.  European Medicines Authority Committee for 
Medicinal Products for Human Use, CHMP/437/04 London, 30 October 2005. 
 315 Ho, supra note 265, at 289–91. 
 316 See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013). 
 317 Ho, supra note 265, at 222. 
 318 Such claims might specifically be grounded on the TPPA Transparency Chapter. 
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Unbounded intellectual property rights are oxymoronic given that they are 
purely and completely based on allowance and recognition by governments.  
Although IP right holders like to elevate their exclusive rights into the realm of 
natural law, IPRs are most commonly recognized as instrumental rights that 
balance incentives for innovation, investment in quality, and creativity against 
access and in some instances disclosure, as is the case for patent rights.319  As 
creatures of legislative and judicial balancing, IPRs are granted and modified 
according to changing social circumstances and emergent technologies.  Subject 
only to superseding international, bilateral, or regional trade agreements or 
relevant constitutional protections, they can be strengthened or weakened, 
lengthened or shortened, and broadened or narrowed by policy changes, 
limitations, and exceptions.  To argue that they set forth a stable, durable set of 
entitlements that can only be strengthened is naïve at best and duplicitous at 
worst.  “Since innovators should know that the legal rules may change while 
they are engaged in research, during the registration process, or even later, it is 
difficult to see how a law that meets the standards required by international IP 
obligations can amount to an expropriation.”320  It would be equally 
disinformational for drug companies to claim that compulsory licenses are 
confiscatory, since government rights to issue compulsory licenses have been 
codified in the Paris Convention for nearly 130 years321 and the governments 
that have issued compulsory licenses or government use orders on medicines 
have had rights to do so enshrined in their national legislation for decades.  
Similarly, it would be disingenuous to claim a violation of a minimum standard 
of treatment or of national treatment simply due to dissatisfaction with a 
particular country’s standard of patentability. 
There are many reasons to renegotiate or even strike the TPPA Investment 
Chapter, as it would dramatically increase corporate power at the same time that 
it restricts government sovereignty to regulate foreign and domestic business 
activities and enforce IP-related claims on an even-handed basis in domestic 
forums.  However, too little attention has been given to the grave risks that the 
Investment Chapter poses to access to medicines.322  Big Pharma has had a big 
                                                                                                                   
 319 Dreyfuss & Frankel, supra note 265. 
 320 Id. at 35.  The concept of legitimate expectations has not generally been interpreted to allow 
arbitral compensation based on the unfreezing of relevant legal frameworks.  Michele Potesta, 
Legitimate Expectation in Investment Treaty Law: Understanding the Roots and Limits of a Controversial 
Concept, 28 ICSID REV. 88, 98–121 (2013). 
 321 Paris Convention, supra note 12, art. 5(A)(2).  
 322 Of course, the dangers are not limited to access to medicines.  There have already been 
multiple foreign investor challenges to public health measures such as tobacco control and 
environmental toxins and degradation.  But, conceivably there are foreign investor risks with 
respect to tightening labor standards, to adopting minimum wages, to enacting climate control 
regulations, to seeking access to green technologies, to sourcing educational materials and 
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hand in the U.S.’s IP Chapter and Investment Chapter proposals.  Negotiating 
parties should refuse to ratify both TRIPS-plus IP standards and enforcement 
measures and substantive investment clause provisions and investor-state 
dispute resolution that will needlessly tie their hands in safeguarding the health 
of their people.  Accordingly, the best solution with respect to IP-specific 
investment claims, and the broader risks of investor-state claims altogether, is to 
delete the Investment Chapter entirely.  There is no compelling reason why 
foreign investors should have rights that are not available to domestic investors 
or why investments should receive special substantive and enforcement 
protections that are not available to other forms of trade in goods and 
services.323 
The second-best solution to the risk of dangerous investor-state arbitral 
proceedings is to rewrite the Investment Chapter to explicitly exclude IPRs and 
to clarify that IPRs are not even indirectly protected by the definition of 
“investment.”324  This solution could best be accomplished by an addition to 
Art. 18.3: “4. This Chapter does not apply with respect to the enforcement of 
any rights conferred pursuant to Chapter 18 (Intellectual Property) or any other 
intellectual property rights contained in any other trade agreement, international 
treaty, or national legislation of any other country.”   
Either of these solutions would force foreign IP rightholders to assert their 
domestically derived IP-related claims in domestic courts, just as domestic IP 
companies must do.  By excluding investor-state IPR claims, Parties could 
maintain sovereign control over the determination of IP standards and the 
adjudication of IP rights, retain freedom to develop their own IP jurisprudence, 
and relegate rightholders to pursue their claims in national courts alleging 
adjudicative and administrative improprieties, confiscatory measures, or other 
government wrongdoing.  There would also be supplemental protection 
pursuant to state-to-state dispute resolution with respect to alleged violations of 
intellectual property norms established in the TPPA.   
The third-best solution is to adopt language that would allow investor claims 
only with respect to IP rights actually granted and judicially affirmed by the 
Party under its existing IP laws and hope that the far-fetched investor claims 
that Eli Lilly has asserted against Canada will be summarily dismissed and 
discredited.  Limiting foreign IP investors to IP rights and expectations 
grounded purely in changeable domestic law, rather than their wish-list of 
                                                                                                                   
scientific journals, and many other matters of public interest, social justice, and human rights 
concern. 
 323 Dreyfus and Frankel reach a more moderate position that recognizes that there might be a 
value of protecting IP-related investment rights in some circumstances.  See Dreyfus & Frankel, 
supra note 265, at 45. 
 324  See Ho, supra note 265, at 275–77. 
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externally established maximalist rights, might avoid abusive investor-state 
claims seeking to enforce ephemeral claims and yet unrealized rights under 
TRIPS, the TPP, or even the national law of other Parties.  
Although solutions to the risk of unbounded corporate power to enforce IP 
rights in investor-state dispute resolution exist, those solutions will not be 
adopted if countries remain injudicious and if activists do not continue to 
highlight the risks of such claims.  The risks concerning access to medicines are 
clear and dramatic—as long as medicines remain inaccessible and unaffordable, 
people will pay with their lives.  However, the risks are equally severe with 
respect to tobacco control, environmental hazards, and many other matters 
implicating human rights and social justice.  It is time for legal academics and 
diverse social movements to shine an illuminating light on the danger of ever-
expanding corporate power and of private arbitration of public interests.  The 
most immediate concern may well be the intersection of the TPPA IP Chapter, 
Transparency Annex, and Investment Chapter, but there are similar dangers in 
the soon-to-be concluded EU-India FTA and in the pending U.S./E.U. Trans-
Atlantic Trade and Partnership.  If investor power remains unchecked, the 
weapon of investor-state claims will be used against poor countries and rich 
countries alike and monopoly power will become even further entrenched to 
the detriment of us all.  
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